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ABSTRACT
WHY WE HELP THE WRONGED:
EMOTIONAL AND EVOLUTIONARY DETERMINANTS OF VICTIM COMPENSATION
Erik W. Thulin
Cristina Bicchieri

Why do third parties choose to help the victims of norm violations? In Chapter 1, we
address this question at the emotional level. We show a relationship between
environment and motivating emotion, in which moral outrage motivates the
compensation of norm violation victims, whereas empathic concern drives compensation
in other situations, at both the trait (Study 1) and state (Studies 2 and 3) levels. This
finding presents a novel question for evolutionary psychology. Differing emotional drivers
are taken to represent distinct underlying cognitive systems. While previous evolutionary
models based on social insurance through indirect reciprocity can account for domaingeneral empathically driven compensation, they fail to address morally outraged
compensation of norm violation victims. In Chapter 2, we extend two evolutionary models
of punishment, showing how those same selection pressures may also account for victim
compensation. We first propose the reputation-signaling hypothesis, under which
compensators signal their community status and knowledge of local norms, making
observers more likely to select them as future interaction partners. We also develop the
norm stabilization hypothesis, in which compensators broadcast their endorsement of the
violated norm, leading conditional conformists to continue to comply, thereby stabilizing
the norm within the group. In Chapter 3, we develop and test empirical predictions of
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both hypotheses. In Study 4, we find support for the joint prediction of both the
reputation-signaling and norm stabilization hypotheses that compensation is increased
when observed by others. In Study 5, we show that, consistent with the norm stabilization
hypothesis, those who observe compensation of a victim of a norm violation are more
likely to conform to that norm. In Study 6, we test the prediction of the reputationsignaling hypothesis that those who compensate are preferred as interaction partners to
those who act similarly pro-socially, but not through compensation. Here we find mixed
results, with compensators being preferred to those who show general pro-sociality, but
less attractive than those who conform to an unrelated norm. Together, this work
provides the first emotional and evolutionary account for the compensation of norm
violation victims.
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INTRODUCTION
At 2AM On June 12, 2016 a man walked into Pulse nightclub in Orlando. Armed with a rifle
and pistol, he went on a shooting spree at a crowd of more than 300 patrons. During the
three-hour hostage standoff that followed, he killed 49 people and wounded 53 (The
Washington Post, 2016). An unprecedented outpouring of support quickly followed. More
than 7 million dollars were raised to compensate victims and their families from over
100,000 individual donors on the GoFundMe platform, the largest crowd-funded donation
campaign in history (Rothaus, 2016).
Such compensatory behavior is not limited to crowd funding. In small-scale societies,
hunter-gatherers with hunting windfalls have shown a willingness to compensate those
with less successful hunts, and to be particularly generous to those who have a reputation
of previously compensating (Gurven, 2004; Marshall, 1961). In modern large scale societies,
the moral intuition that third parties ought to compensate victims has been incorporated
into the mandate of the state. This belief is expressed in government sponsored health and
unemployment benefits (Wendt, Frisina, & Rothgang, 2009). This intuition is also
enshrined in many judicial systems, such as the New Zealand social insurance plan, which
bans suing employers for injury. Instead, injury claims are paid from a central fund
(Palmer, 1979). Similar legislation has been passed in the US, such as the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund, which collectively compensated terrorist attack victims for
their loss (Harris, 2006). Although one might think of this as an extreme case, similar
statutes have been enacted to address other harms, such as the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act, the Price-Anderson Act to compensate those injured during nuclear
1

disasters, and the Black Lungs Benefits Act to compensate coal workers and their families
(Mullenix & Stewart, 2002).
Third party intervention, including compensation, has drawn significant interest from
across social science, with particular focus from psychology and behavioral economics.
Experiments have shown third parties to be willing to compensate in a variety of
experimental setups (Charness, Cobo-Reyes, & Jimenez, 2008; Chavez & Bicchieri, 2013;
Leliveld, van Dijk, & van Beest, 2012). Across these studies, not only were third parties
willing to compensate, they are willing to do so at a cost, paralleling the costs found in the
natural environment (Baron, 2007).
These cases demonstrate that the drive to compensate exists across cultures, from hunter
gathers to large-scale societies, permeating multiple levels of social interaction, from
individual to individual exchanges to the legal regimes of nation states. Why do people
choose to engage in compensation, even at a cost to themselves? It is this question which
motivates this dissertation.
We approach the question of why people compensate from two interrelated levels of
analysis: proximate emotional motivators and ultimate evolutionary selection pressures.
Chapter 1 focuses on the emotional determinants. Psychologists have argued that the most
proximate motivator of compensation is empathic concern for the victim (Coke, Batson, &
McDavis, 1978; Batson, Duncan, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Toi & Batson, 1982). Despite
compensation occurring in many different social contexts, the literature has widely
glossed over these differences, treating them all as the result of a single mental process.
These contexts differ on at least one broad dimension: the cause of the victim’s loss. While
2

some victims’ losses can be attributed to bad luck, with no party to blame, others’ losses
are the result of a perpetrator’s violation of the social rules governing that situation.
Punishment, another possible behavioral response to a norm violation, has also been
attributed emotional motivations. However, whereas compensation has previously been
accounted for as the result of empathic concern, punishment has been linked to
experiencing moral outrage (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Jordan, McAuliffe, & Rand, 2017;
Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). Despite their purportedly differing motivators, in the
context of a norm violation, both compensation and punishment can serve similar
cognitive goals, such as honoring the violated norm or giving people what they deserve
(Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006).
Up to this point, there has been no investigation into whether different emotional states
may motivate compensation in different social contexts. Given the literature suggesting
that other behavioral responses to norm violations (namely, punishment) are driven by
moral outrage, and that both punishment and compensation can achieve similar cognitive
goals in response to a norm violation, we propose that the broad characterization of
compensation being driven by empathic concern across all domains may have been hasty.
Instead, we tested a more nuanced account of the emotional motivators for compensation.
We suggest that, while compensation may be driven by empathic concern when a loss is
due to chance or a poor choice by the victim, moral outrage motivates people to
compensate the victims of social norm violations, just as it motivates the punishment of
perpetrators in the same context. Chapter 1 examines this proposal on both the trait
(Study 1) and state levels (Studies 2 and 3).
3

The general pattern of results from Chapter 1, showing that moral outrage leads
compensation in some contexts, whereas empathic concern leads to compensation in
others, present an explanatory gap for evolutionary psychology. Previous work proposed
the rationale for victim compensation as a form of efficient social insurance, supported
through indirect reciprocity (Nettle, Panchanathan, Rai, & Fiske, 2011). However, if
compensation is motivated by two different emotions in two different contexts, this
suggests two different underlying mechanisms. Whereas empathic driven compensation
across a wide variety of situations is quite consistent with the social insurance hypothesis,
the finding that moral outrage drives the compensation of norm violation victims
demands its own evolutionary rationale.
Chapter 2 takes on the challenge of providing an evolutionary account of the
compensation of norm violation victims driven by moral outrage. Expanding on
evolutionary models of punishment, we show how the same selection pressures which
have been proposed to account for punishment of perpetrators may also account for the
compensation of their victims. Specifically, we suggest that compensation may signal the
compensator’s quality as a future partner (reputation signaling hypothesis), or may help
stabilize cooperative social norms within a group (norm stabilization hypothesis).
After developing these hypotheses, we then set about to test them. As the reputation
signaling and norm stabilization hypotheses are the first evolutionary accounts of
specifically the compensation of norm violation victims, we do not have an alternative
model to make contrary predictions. Instead, we derive and test unique untested
predictions of each of the accounts. As both of our proposed accounts argue that
4

compensation emerged for its informational value, they both predict that compensation
should be sensitive to observation, which we test in Study 4. We then disentangle our two
possible accounts, testing the norm stabilization hypothesis’ prediction that people should
be more willing to conform to a norm after witnessing compensation (Study 5) and the
costly signaling hypothesis’ prediction that participants should prefer to interact with
compensators (Study 5) separately. Together, this work provides the first emotional and
evolutionary account of the emotional and evolutionary psychology underlying the
compensation of victims of norm violations.
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CHAPTER 1
A long history of research in behavioral economics has demonstrated third parties’
willingness to punish rule violators. This has been shown in a variety of games, including
the prisoner’s dilemma, ultimatum game, trust game, and dictator game (Charness et al.,
2008; Chavez & Bicchieri, 2013; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Kurzban, DeScioli, & O'Brien,
2007). This willingness has been found not only in the lab, but also in the field (Balafoutas,
Nikiforakis, & Rockenbach, 2014; Mathew & Boyd, 2011). Although varying in size and
prevalence, third-party punishment has been observed across a wide swath of cultures
(Henrich, et al., 2010; Herrmann, Christian, & Gachter, 2008). A more recent line of
inquiry has shown that third parties are also willing to compensate the victims of such rule
violations in the ultimatum, dictator and trust games (Charness et al., 2008; Chavez &
Bicchieri, 2013; Leliveld et al., 2012).
Across all these studies, not only were third parties willing to engage in punishment and
compensation, but they were willing to pay to do so. This cost is crucial for their external
validity, as both punishment and compensation are costly in the natural environment.
When one engages in punishment, not only does one suffer the direct cost of necessary
effort, but one is also exposed to the expected cost of retaliation, a risk born out in both
the lab and field (Chagnon, 1988; Cinyabuguma, Page, & Putterman, 2006; Nikiforakis,
2008). Compensation bears the rather direct cost of losing whatever one chooses to
compensate the victim with (Baron, 2007).
At the most proximate level, the willingness to engage in both these costly behaviors
seems to be motivated by emotion. Much of past research on helping behavior has focused
6

on empathic concern, a constellation of emotions including feelings of sympathy,
compassion, and tenderness as its primary driver (Batson et al., 1981). Empathic concern
can be understood as an other-oriented emotional state, where one’s own emotions are
driven to be similar in valiance, although not necessarily identical, to those of someone in
need (Batson, 1991). Empathic concern appears to lead to helping someone who received
an unequal allocation in an economic game (Leliveld et al., 2012), volunteering to help a
sick student (Coke et al., 1978), and even taking an electric shock to save a stranger from
having to do so (Toi & Batson, 1982).
In contrast, anger, rather than empathic concern, is associated with a willingness to
punish those who free-ride on the public good (Fehr & Gachter, 2001) or sanction
someone who offers an unfair deal (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). People even become
angry as third party observers of unfair treatment, leading them to engage in third-party
punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Jordan et al., 2016).
The literature has treated compensation across various situations as generally similar
psychologically. However, the contexts under which one might compensate vary
dramatically. Broadly, one might compensate a victim when no one is at fault, or one
could compensate victim of someone else’s wrongdoing. Importantly, in the case of
compensating the victim of someone’s wrongdoing, compensation can serve some of the
psychological functions previously identified as motivating punishment. Just as people
punish to result in a more just outcome (Carlsmith et al., 2002), one can compensate a
victim to give them what they deserve. Similarly, other work has suggested that people
punish to restore the values of their community (Schroeder, Steel, & Woodell, 2003; Tyler
7

& Boeckmann, 1997; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006) Just as punishment can reassert the
social norm through costly signaling, the signal of compensating a victim of a violation
can serve a similar purpose.
Given this symmetry in context and motivation between the punishment of norm
violators and the compensation of their victims, we propose that there may be a similar
symmetry in their emotional antecedents. We therefore suggest a finer grained
understanding of the emotional motivators for compensation, involving both empathic
concern and moral outrage. Specifically, we propose that the compensation of the victim
of a norm violation is driven by the compensator’s feeling of moral outrage, rather than
their empathic concern for the victim. We therefore designed the following studies to test
the hypothesis that moral outrage drives the compensation of victims, but only when the
victim’s loss was the result of a social norm violation.
In all three studies, we compare the effect of moral outrage and empathic concern on
compensation across a variety of contexts, both through trait level correlations and
experimental manipulation. The empathic concern hypothesis argues that empathic
concern is the key emotional motivator for helping victims (Batson et al., 1981; Coke et al.,
1978; Toi & Batson, 1982). However, based on moral outrage being the emotional
antecedent to other behavioral responses to norm violations, such as punishment, we
propose an alternative account, under which moral outrage, rather than empathic concern
drives compensation. It is this divergence in accounts between the empathic concern
hypothesis and our own that these studies aim to test.
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In Study 1, we looked at the relationships between one’s general dispositions to feel moral
outrage and empathic concern (trait moral outrage and trait empathic concern), and
willingness to compensate. Participants played a modified version of a hypothetical third
party trust game (Charness, Cobo-Reyes, & Jimenez, 2008). They were assigned the role of
a disinterested observer and shown the results of a modified trust game in which a player
lost their endowment either due to the violation of a social norm, their investment going
poorly, or chance. Participants were then given the opportunity to compensate this
player’s loss. In this study, we hypothesized that, contrary to the empathic concern
hypothesis, trait level moral outrage would predict participant’s willingness to compensate
the victim of a social norm violation, but not when the loss was due to an investment gone
awry or chance.
In Studies 2 and 3 we expanded our critique of empathic concern hypothesis to make a
stronger causal claim for the role of moral outrage in driving compensation of norm
violation victims. In Study 2, we experimentally manipulated participants’ empathic
concern and moral outrage while they took part in the modified trust games used in Study
1. In Study 3, we aimed to extend and replicate Study 2 using monetary incentives and a
simplified compensation dependent measure. For these studies, we predicted that
increasing moral outrage would lead to increased compensation of norm violation victims,
but not those who experienced a loss for other reasons.

Study 1
In this study, we assessed the relationship between moral outrage and compensation at
the trait level. We measured participants’ willingness to compensate across a variety of
9

hypothetical contexts. In each context, another person lost money, either due to someone
else’s violation of a social norm, a bad investment, or chance. After observing this person
losing money, the participant had the opportunity to compensate the victim for the loss
by transferring some of his or her endowment to that person. We then measured each
participant’s general propensity to feel both moral outrage and empathic concern. We
predicted that one’s propensity to experience moral outrage would correlate with their
willingness to compensate beyond their propensity of experience empathic concern, but
only in the context of a norm violation.

Method
We recruited 241 participants (108 men, mean age of 33) from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(AMT) platform to participate in this study. We chose AMT to draw a more diverse sample
than available from undergraduates. Previous work found that AMT samples are more
diverse on age, geography, and ethnicity than undergraduate populations. In addition, the
same work found responses from AMT to be at least as reliable as that gathered through
traditional methods (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).
To measure the degree to which empathic concern and moral outrage influenced third
party willingness to compensate across a variety of contexts, we used a series of modified
hypothetical trust games with third party compensators. In the original trust game, the
experimenter assigned participants to one of two roles, either that of the investor or the
trustee. The investor received an initial endowment and could choose to transfer any of
that amount to the trustee. The experimenter would then triple any amount transferred
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by the investor. The trustee could then choose to send any portion of the tripled amount
back to the investor (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995).
Using the original trust game as a foundation, we created three different interactions in
which a participant may lose their endowment, due to either the violation of a reciprocity
norm, a bad investment, or chance. These three situations served as three conditions in
the study.
In the norm violation interaction, the experimenter endowed an investor with $10. The
investor could then choose whether or not to transfer that $10 to the trustee. If the
investor chose to keep the $10, the game ended. If they chose to transfer the $10 to the
trustee, the experimenter quadrupled the amount to $40. At this point, the trustee could
then choose to either keep the $40 or to return half ($20) to the investor. If the trustee
chose to return half, the interaction ended. However, if the trustee chose to keep the
entire $40, a third party observer, who was endowed with $10, was given an incentive
compatible elicitation measuring the most the third party would be willing to pay to
restore the investor to the original endowment of $10.
The bad investment situation was very similar to the norm violation situation, but with a
single modification. Instead of the trustee having a choice of whether to transfer the $20 of
the $40 to the investor, a randomizing device selected whether to return the $20. We
chose the probabilities of an 80% chance of return of the $20 and a 20% chance of
returning $0, which was known to all participants. These values were chosen to mimic the
return rates in trust games of a similar setup (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009). After
observing the interaction, if the $20 was not returned to the investor, the third party
11

observer had the same choice as in the norm violation condition. Importantly, in this
version of the interaction, if the investor chose to transfer their endowment, whether or
not the $20 was returned to them no longer depended on the trustee conforming to a
norm.
Finally, the chance interaction was similar to the bad investment interaction, but with one
more modification. Instead of the investor having the choice of whether their $10 is
transferred to the trustee (and then quadrupled by the experimenter), a randomizing
device selected whether the $10 is transferred. We chose probabilities of a 50% chance of
transferring the $10 and a 50% chance of not transferring the $10, which was common
knowledge. These probabilities were again chosen to mimic the investment rates in trust
games in a similar setup (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009). As in the bad investment
interaction, if the $10 was transferred to the trustee, a randomizing device then selected
whether or not $20 is returned to the investor. If the $20 was not transferred back to the
investor, the third party observer then had the same choice as in the previous two
situations.
We randomly assigned each participant to one of the three interactions. After reading the
complete description of one of the interactions, each respondent participated in a
hypothetical instance of the interaction as the third party observer in which the investor’s
money was transferred to the trustee, but none was returned to the investor. After
answering how much they would be willing to pay to restore the investor to their original
$10, participants responded to inventories of trait propensity to feel moral outrage and
trait propensity to feel empathic concern.
12

We adapted a four item trait moral outrage scale from previous work (Wakslak, Jost,
Tyler, & Chen, 2007). For each item, participants expressed their agreement with a
statement on a 7-point scale from “does not describe me well” to “describes me very well”.
Example statements included “I feel angry when I learn about people suffering from
unfairness” and “I think it’s shameful when injustice is allowed to occur”.
We used the seven item Empathic Concern Subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index
to measure trait empathic concern (Davis, 1983). For each item, participants expressed
how well it described them, on a five point scale of “does not describe me well” to
“describes me very well”. Items included “Sometimes, I don’t feel very sorry for other
people when they are having problems” and “I often have tender, concerned feelings for
people less fortunate than me”.

Results
188 participants (78% of the sample) correctly responded to at least nine of the ten
comprehension questions asked throughout the instructions. In order to ensure high
quality data, we used this subset in further analyses.
We found the four item trait moral outrage scale and seven item trait empathic concern
scale to be highly internally reliable (α=.91 and α=.90, respectively). Additionally, trait
level empathic concern and moral outrage were highly correlated with each other,
r(186)=.62, p<.001. This high degree of correlation lead us to conduct all analyses of these
variables controlling for the other in order to isolate the unique contribution of each.
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For each condition, we analyzed the partial correlation between compensation and trait
moral outrage controlling for trait empathic concern as well as trait empathic concern
controlling for trait moral outrage. These results can be found in Table 1.
Table 1.
Partial correlations between compensation in each condition and empathic concern
controlling for moral outrage and for moral outrage controlling for empathic
concern
Condition
Norm Violation

Empathic Concern

Moral Outrage

-.152

.270*

Bad Investment

.397*

-.092

Chance

.012

-.063

Note. All values are partial Pearson correlation coefficients. *p<.05

Our key prediction was that moral outrage would predict compensation in the Norm
Violation condition, while not doing so in the Chance and Bad Investment conditions. We
see this supported in the Moral Outrage column of Table 1, where, controlling for
empathic concern, moral outrage was significantly correlated with compensation in the
Norm Violation condition, r(65)=.27, p=.027. Also importantly, we see that, controlling for
empathic concern, moral outrage predicted compensation in neither the Chance
condition r(56)=-.063, p=.636 nor the Bad Investment condition r(58)=-.091, p=.49. In fact,
both of these non-significant effects had a negative sign.
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We observed that empathic concern, controlling for moral outrage, was correlated with
compensation in the Bad Investment condition r(58)=.40, p=.002. However, empathic
concern was not correlated with compensation in either the Norm Violation condition
r(65)=-.15, p=.22 or the Chance condition r(56)=.01, p=.93.

Discussion
Past research includes numerous examples of helping behavior correlating with empathic
concern, across a variety of contexts, from volunteering to help a sick student to paying to
compensate someone who received an unfair allocation in a behavioral game (Coke et al.,
1978; Leliveld et al., 2012; Toi & Batson, 1982). Our initial finding that the dispositions to
feel moral outrage and the disposition to feel empathic concern are highly correlated
suggests an important caveat when interpreting earlier studies: as these experiments did
not address moral outrage as a covariate, it is possible that effects interpreted as being
driven by empathic concern may in fact have been driven by an important third variable,
namely moral outrage. Study 1 investigated the plausibility of this claim, looking at the
unique contributions of trait empathic concern and trait moral outrage across three
contexts. In support of this past literature, we find that empathic concern does maintain a
unique correlation with compensation controlling for moral outrage, but only in particular
contexts, namely in the Bad Investment condition where someone makes a risky decision
and suffers a loss. We do not see any unique correlation between compensation and
empathic concern in the Chance condition, where all transfers were randomized.
Although not directly linked to the questions at hand, future work may illuminate what
differences between the Bad Investment and Chance conditions lead to the differing effect

15

of empathic concern, and perhaps answer what motivations may be present in
compensating the victims in a chance-like scenario.
Our focal question for this study asked whether a propensity to feel moral outrage was
related to a willingness to compensate, and whether that effect was limited to the case of
social norm violations. The analysis of the correlations of moral outrage with
compensation, controlling for empathic concern, across the various conditions suggest the
answer to both questions is yes. In the case of the social norm violation, we find that
compensation correlated with moral outrage, controlling for empathic concern. In
addition, we find that moral outrage did not correlate with compensation in the other two
conditions. This provides evidence that the empathic concern hypothesis, that helping in
general is due to empathic concern is not sufficient: a more fine grained account is
required. However, this study only looked at trait emotional dispositions, and therefore
assessed correlations. In order to better understand the causal effect of emotion on
compensation, direct manipulation is required.

Study 2.a
Study 2 extended the findings of Study 1 from the trait domain into that of emotional
states. Study 2.a investigated the relationship between participants’ current level of moral
outrage and the degree to which they were willing to compensate. Whereas the previous
study relied on correlational relationships with trait variables, we were able to manipulate
emotional states, allowing for stronger causal claims. In this study, we manipulated the
amount of moral outrage a participant experiences using video inductions. We then
assessed their willingness to compensate across the three hypothetical situations used in
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Study 1. Finally, we measured the degree to which each participant was currently
experiencing moral outrage and empathic concern. We predicted that those led to
experience moral outrage would be willing to compensate more than those who were not,
but that this effect would be limited to the norm violation context. Additionally, we
predicted that, controlling for empathic concern as a covariate, experienced moral outrage
would mediate the effect of the video induction on willingness to compensate.

Method
We recruited 990 participants (471 men, mean age of 33) from the AMT platform to
participate in this study.
We experimentally manipulated moral outrage, measuring its effect on compensation
across the three hypothetical situations developed in Study 1: norm violation, bad
investment, or chance. Each participant read instructions describing the interaction, while
answering a series of comprehension questions throughout.
After reading the instructions, but before being told what role in the interaction they
would be assigned to, participants watched a short video, serving as the manipulation of
moral outrage. This manipulation took advantage of people’s tendency to attribute arousal
states such as anger to whatever stimulus they are currently being exposed to (Schachter &
Singer, 1962). Those assigned to moral outrage watched a short video of a boy being
attacked by a bully, which past work identified as significantly increasing moral outrage
(Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998). Participants assigned to low moral outrage watched a
video of abstract line patterns, previously found to be emotionally neutral (Gross &
Levenson, 1995).
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After watching one of the two videos, all participants were assigned to the role of the third
party observer and asked how they would respond if the investor’s funds were transferred
to the trustee, but none were returned to the investor. Participants were then given the
same hypothetical version of an incentive compatible elicitation used in Study 1,
measuring their willingness to pay to restore the investor to their original $10. After giving
their responses, participants then answered a series of questions measuring their current
levels of empathic concern and moral outrage.
The four item state moral outrage scale was used in previous work for the same purpose
(Piazza, Russell, & Sousa, 2013). For each item, participants rated the degree to which they
agreed on a five point scale from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree”. Example items
included “I feel angry” and “I feel outraged”. We adapted three items from the Empathic
Concern Subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index used in Study 1 in order to measure
state empathic concern. For each item, participants rated how much they agreed on the
same five point scale used for the state moral outrage items. Items included “I feel sorry
for Person A” and “I was disturbed by what happened to Person A”, Person A being the
investor in their interaction.

Results
754 (76%) of participants correctly responded to 9 of the 10 comprehension questions. To
ensure data quality, we only analyzed the responses from these participants.
Both the four item state moral outrage scale and the three item empathic concern scale
showed high degrees of internal reliability (α=.958 and α=.847, respectively). Using the
moral outrage scale as a manipulation check, we found that moral outrage was
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significantly manipulated in the norm violation situation t(230)= 5.18, p<.001, chance
situation t(262)=4.51, p<.001, and the bad investment situation t(256)=3.27, p=.001. These
effects ranged in size across situations from d=.41 to d=.68, demonstrating a medium sized
effect of the video manipulation on moral outrage.
We report mean levels of compensation across conditions in Figure 1. In the norm
violation situation, we found that those who watched the moral outrage video were willing
to pay significantly more to compensate (M=4.09) than those who watched the neutral
control video (M=3.16), t(230)=2.41, p=.017. We then tested whether a subject’s feeling of
moral outrage mediated this effect, the results of which can be found in Figure 2. In this
and all following mediation analyses, we ran non-parametric bias-corrected boostrap
analysis (Hayes & Preacher, 2014) with 10,000 resamples. Controlling for empathic concern
as a covariate, moral outrage significantly mediated the effect of the video manipulation

Average Willingness to Pay to Restore
Investor to $10 ($)

on the amount participants were willing to pay to compensate B=.31, 95% CI=.08 to .65.
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Figure 1: Average willingness to pay of participants to restore investor to $10 by condition,
error bars as 95% confidence intervals
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Participants who watched the moral outrage-inducing video in the bad investment
situation also compensated significantly more (M=3.53) than those who watched the
neutral control video (M=2.64), t(262)=.42, p=.042. We observed in that situation that
empathic concern also differed significantly between the moral outrage and control video
conditions t(262)=2.40, p=.017. Mediation analysis showed that while moral outrage was
not a significant mediator of the effect of the video on compensation, B=.01, 95% CI=-.22
to .21, empathic concern was a significant mediator, B=.19, 95% CI=.02 to .38.
In the chance situation, those who watched the moral outrage video also compensated
significantly more (M=4.09) than those who did not (M=3.16), t(256)=2.39, p=.017.
However, similar to the bad investment situation, controlling for empathic concern as a
covariate, moral outrage was not a significant mediator of the effect of the video on
compensation, B=-.17, 95% CI=-.25 to .07.
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Discussion
The finding that increased moral outrage led to increased willingness to compensate in
the norm violation situation provides support for the causal role of moral outrage in
compensating the victims of social norm violations. The finding that, controlling for
empathic concern, moral outrage mediated the effect of the video manipulation on
compensation further bolsters the claim of moral outrage’s causal role.
We did not predict that compensation would be higher in the bad investment and chance
situations after watching the moral outrage inducing video, which led us to conduct
further tests to better understand those results. We observed that, although we chose the
video due to its limited effect on other emotions, it also significantly affected empathic
concern in the bad investment situation, which allowed for the possibility that it was the
change in empathic concern, rather than moral outrage, which drove the effect. To test for
this, we used mediation analysis, allowing for both empathic concern and moral outrage
to serve as mediators of the video’s effect on compensation in the bad investment
situation. The finding that, in the bad investment situation, empathic concern, and not
moral outrage, mediated the effect of the video on compensation is consistent with
empathic concern, rather than moral outrage, driving compensation.
Similarly, we ran a mediation analysis in the chance situation, testing the degree to which
moral outrage mediated the effect of the video on compensation. Similar to the bad
investment situation, we did not find moral outrage to be a significant mediator. Here we
see a parallel of Study 1, where we found support for moral outrage not being a
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determining factor of compensation in the chance situation, but these data do not speak
to what may actually be the emotional determinants.
One important concern to address is that of a demand effect. Demand effects can occur
when participants are aware of what the experimenter expects them to do, and choose to
conform to that expectation (Orne, 1962). Although the effect of deception, both within a
given study and on the public good of participant pool perceptions, is a hotly contested
and ongoing debate (Cook & Yamagishi, 2008; Hertwig & Ortmann, 2008), we chose to
adopt the proscription of deception throughout this studies. As a result, when participant
emotional state was manipulated, no misleading cover story was given to ensure that the
intent of the manipulation was obfuscated. This raises the question of whether the
observed effects could be due to demand.
In order to assess the plausibility of a demand effect, we need to first establish what
conditions are necessary for it to have occurred, and what patterns of data we would
predict under this alternative account. As this study was conducted between, rather than
within subjects, participants would first need to infer that the difference between
conditions was what video was played. Participants would then need to correctly guess
that the experimenter prediction was for those having seen the bully video, rather than
the control video, to be more willing to compensate. After determining what element
differed between conditions as well as the predicted direction of effect, participants would
need to choose to conform to that deduced expectation.
We then need to consult the pattern of results and assess the degree to which they are
consistent with the demand effect rationale. We found that moral outrage mediated the
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effect of the video on compensation in the Norm Violation condition, but in neither the
Bad Investment nor the Chance conditions. For this pattern to occur under the demand
effect account, we must not only accept the assumptions listed above, but also that
participants in the Norm Violation condition who reported moral outrage would figure
that they should compensate more, but that participants in the Bad Invest and Chance
conditions who experienced more moral outrage would figure out that, given the
parameters of the game they were assigned to, the experimenter would not predict that
the video’s effect should be mediated by a feeling of moral outrage, and would choose to
compensate less frequently.
These assumptions are possible to hold. However, we find the alternative hypothesis that
empathic concern and moral outrage have different effects on compensation in different
contexts to be more plausible. Consistent with this conclusion, the Gross and Levenson
(1995) video manipulations have previously been used to manipulate emotional state
without a guise (Gross & Levenson, 1997; Drouvelis & Grosskopf, 2016; Fredrickson &
Levenson, 1998).

Study 2.b
Study 2.b closely mirrors the design of study 2.a, but focuses on the role of state empathic
concern rather than moral outrage. In this study, empathic concern towards the person
who lost their money was manipulated by having the participant either write a response to
a prompt asking them to take the perspective of the person who lost their money, or to
neutrally describe the interaction. Each respondent then participated in one of the three
situations described in Study 1. We predicted that, consistent with previous work, those
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who responded to the high empathic concern prompt would compensate more in the
situations not involving a norm violation, but that this pattern would not be present in the
norm violation situation. Additionally, we predicted that, controlling for moral outrage,
empathic concern would mediate the effect of the perspective taking manipulation on
compensation in the non-norm violation situations.

Method
We recruited 998 participants (472 men, mean age of 34) from the AMT platform to
participate in this study.
The design of Study 2.b closely mirrored that of 2.a, with the key difference being our
manipulation of empathic concern rather than moral outrage. Whereas anger is
experienced as a general emotional state, empathic concern is, by its very nature,
expressing concern for a particular person, which did not allow us to use a video
manipulation. Instead, after reading the rules to the interaction, being assigned to their
role as the third party, and seeing that the investor did not receive any money back, we
had participants write in response to one of two prompts. In the control conditions, we
asked participants to “objectively describe what has happened in the interaction so far”. In
the empathic concern conditions, we asked participants to “describe the feelings and
emotions Person A may be feeling right now”.

Results
769 (77%) of participants correctly responded to 9 of the 10 comprehension questions. To
ensure data quality, we only analyzed the responses from these participants.
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Using the empathic concern scale as a manipulation check, we found that the prospective
taking prompt lead to higher empathic concern relative to the control in the norm
violation situation, t(269)=2.92, p=.004, the investment situation, t(244)=3.34, p=.001, and
the chance situation, t(250)=3.40, p=.001. These effects were moderate in size (d=.36 to
d=.43).
We report mean levels of compensation in Figure 3. Those in the bad investment situation
who received the empathic concern prompt (M=4.03) compensated significantly more
than those who received the objective prompt (M=3.05). In the bad investment situation,
controlling for moral outrage as a covariate, participants’ level of empathic concern
significantly mediated the effect of the prompt manipulation on compensation, D=.45,
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Figure 3: Average willingness to pay of participants to restore investor to $10 by condition,
error bars as 95% confidence intervals

In the chance situation, we did not find that those who responded to the empathic
concern prompt (M=3.13) compensated significantly more than those who responded to
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the objective prompt (M=2.89), t(250)=.822, p=.41. Similarly, in the norm violation
situation, we found no significant difference in compensation between those who received
the empathic concern prompt (M=3.61) and those who received the objective prompt
(M=3.54), t(269)=.132, p=.90.

Discussion
The empathic concern prompt leading to higher compensation in the bad investment
situation supports the hypothesis and results from previous studies that empathic concern
can drive compensation behavior. Mediation analysis further buttresses this finding,
showing that empathic concern mediates the effect of the written prompt on
compensation.
Consistent with our findings in Study 1, we did not find a significant effect of empathic
concern on compensation in the chance situation. This provides additional motivation for
further investigation into what may be driving compensation in this context. We also do
not find a significant effect of empathic concern on compensation in the norm violation
situation, consistent with our general hypothesis that moral outrage, rather than empathic
concern, drives compensation in the context of norm violations.
Participants in Study 2.b were subject to similar possible demand characteristics as those
in Study 2.a. We again suggest that our proposed account is more plausible than subjects
inferring the particular manipulation, our particular expected direction of effect, and
choosing to comply with that effect. The particular pattern of results in Study 2.b do also
not lend themselves to a demand explanation. Note that the effect of the empathic
concern video manipulation is found in the bad investment situation, but not the norm
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violation situation. For this to be the case under the demand account, not only would
subjects in the bad investment situation need to deduce that those who were told to write
about the investor’s emotions were expected to compensate more than those who were
told to describe the situation, but those in the norm violation condition would need to
deduce that participants in their situation were expected to not be effected by the
manipulation.

Study 3
We designed Study 3 to replicate and generalize the finding of Studies 1 and 2.a that, in
the case of a social norm violation, moral outrage correlated with (Study 1) and drove
(Study 2.a) participants’ willingness to compensate. This study had two manipulations.
First, participants were assigned to either the norm violation or bad investment situations
previously described in Study 1. Second, participants were assigned to either a moral
outrage or neutral emotional video manipulation described in Study 2.a. We made two
other key modifications from Study 2.a. First, participants interacted with each other for
actual money rather than responding to hypothetical situations. Second, participant
feedback suggested that the willingness to compensate measure used in Studies 1 and 2
was complex and therefore difficult to understand. We therefore substituted a simple
transfer with multiplier as the dependent measure to improve participant comprehension.
We predicted that those who watched the moral outrage inducing video would
compensate more than those who did not, but only in the social norm violation situation.
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Method
We recruited 502 participants (243 men, mean age of 38) from the AMT platform to
participate in this study.
Participants were divided into two phases. Those in Phase 1 read a description of a trust
game, similar to those used in the previous studies. In the norm violation situation,
investors were endowed with $0.50 and trustees with $0.00. The investor could choose to
either keep their $0.50 or transfer it to the trustee. If transferred, the experimenter tripled
the amount to $1.50. The trustee then had the option of whether to keep the entire $1.50 or
to return $0.75 to the investor. As in the previous studies, the bad investment situation
mirrors the norm violation situation, aside from one variation. Instead of the trustee
choosing whether or not half the transfer was returned, a randomizing device selected,
returning half the endowment 80% of the time and none of the endowment 20% of the
time. So as not to deceive participants, they were informed that the choices of future
participants may impact their payoffs. Phase 1 was run until, for both the norm violation
and bad investment situations, an investor chose to transfer their endowment to the
trustee and the trustee chose not to return the sum. These final pairs were used as the
focal dyads.
After establishing the focal dyads, all further participants were assigned to Phase 2. Each
participant in Phase 2 read a description of the trust game outlined above. Participants
were told that they were assigned to the role of a third party for an investor and trustee
pair and given an endowment of $0.75. They were told that if the investor chose to transfer
their $0.50 to the trustee but $0.75 was not returned from the trustee to the investor, they
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would have the opportunity to transfer any amount of their $0.75 to the investor, and that
the amount they chose to transfer would be doubled by the experimenter.
After reading these interaction instructions, Phase 2 participants were shown one of the
two videos used in Study 2.a, to either induce moral outrage or serve as a neutral control.
After watching the video induction, participants were shown the result of one of the focal
dyads, in which the investor chose to transfer to the trustee and either a randomizing
device or the trustee selected not to return half the endowment, depending on condition1.
After seeing the result, participants then chose how much of their endowment to transfer
to the investor, which was then doubled by the experimenter.
After making their selections, participants responded to the state moral outrage and
empathic concern scales used in Studies 2.a and 2.b. Participants were immediately paid
their $0.50 show up fee, and then paid their bonus amounts five to seven days later.

Results
385 (77%) of participants recruited for Phase 2 correctly responded to 4 of the 5
comprehension questions. To ensure data quality, we only analyzed the responses from
these participants.

1

The method of using a focal dyad for all future decision has previously been used previously to
maintain non-deception, as nothing false is told to participants, while increasing the efficiency of
the study by minimizing the number of subjects necessary to achieve adequate power (Kurzban et
al., 2007).
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Using the four item state moral outrage scale as a manipulation check, we observed that
the moral anger video significantly increased the level of moral outrage relative to the
control video, t(486)=4.87, p<.001. This is a moderately sized effect (d=.44).
The mean compensation values across conditions are shown in Figure 4. We predicted
that, in the norm violation situation, those participants who watched the moral outrageinducing video would compensate to a greater amount. However, the difference observed
was small and non-significant, t(196)=.40, p=.687.
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Figure 4: Average amount transferred from participants to investor by condition,
error bars as 95% confidence intervals

Due to this surprising result, we also investigated the partial correlations between moral
outrage and compensation, controlling for empathic concern, in both the norm violation
and bad investment contexts. Controlling for empathic concern, we found that moral
outrage was significantly correlated with compensation in the norm violation context,
r(197)=.15, p=.03. This differed from the bad investment context, in which we did not find a
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significant relationship between moral outrage and compensation, controlling for
empathic concern, r(184)=.09, p=.24.

Discussion
The lack of an effect of the video manipulation on compensation was surprising, and
inconsistent with the results of Studies 1 and 2.a. There were two key differences between
the previous studies and Study 3, which may have affected the result. The first, and most
concerning, is that the effect may exist for hypothetical exchanges but does not generalize
to exchanges involving actual incentives. There is reason to be suspicious of this
possibility, as past research has shown that subjects drawn from AMT respond similarly to
hypothetical games as they do to those involving actual money, including in the specific
context of trust games (Amir, Rand, & Gal, 2012).
A second difference between the previous studies and Study 3 was the elicitation and
measurement of compensation. In the previous studies, we used a hypothetical incentive
compatible elicitation of the most one was willing to pay to restore the investor to their
original endowment. We gave each participant a series of binary choices, asking if they
would be willing to pay X in order to restore the investor to $10, where X ranged from $1 to
the third party’s entire endowment of $10. After making their choices, one of the ten
choices was randomly selected and carried out (for example, if the “Would you be willing
to pay $3 of your $10 to make person A end with $10?” question was selected and the
participant chose “Yes”, then the participant would have $3 deducted from their
endowment, and the investor would receive $10).
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We chose this original method because willingness to pay has a high degree of granularity
as compared to a single choice (for example, only asking would you pay $2.50 to restore
the investor to $10). It also measures the implicit lowest compensation tradeoff ratio that a
participant sees as making the transfer worthwhile, which we find to be a compelling
proxy for one’s willingness to compensate. For example, being willing to transfer $4 but
not $5 to restore the investor to $10 implies the minimum acceptable compensation
tradeoff ratio between 2.5 and 2. This is in contrast to choosing an amount to transfer with
a fixed multiplier, which the interpretation of is much more ambiguous. As opposed to the
willingness to pay measure, one cannot impute the minimum acceptable multiplier (as the
multiplier is held constant). Instead, the amount transferred could indicate what the third
party thinks would be the correct amount of compensation, rather than to what degree
the third party cares whether the investor receives that correct compensation.
Although the willingness to compensate measure had these desirable properties, feedback
from participants in Studies 1 and 2 suggested that the method was very difficult to
understand, and at a minimum, cognitively taxing. As we were particularly interested in
the emotional determinants of the compensation decision, we chose to simplify the
compensation measure in Study 3 by simply asking how much of their endowments
participants wished to transfer to the investor, with a 2x multiplier. The lack of an effect in
this case may therefore be because, while previous dependent measures assessed to what
degree the third party wanted to restore the investor to their original state, the current
measure may be assessing what amount the third party thinks is the correct amount of
compensation, which may be less subject to influence from moral outrage.
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These concerns are partially assuaged by correlations within the data being consistent
with Studies 1 and 2.a. Namely, the finding that moral outrage correlated with
compensation in the norm violation situation but not in the bad investment situation,
controlling for empathic concern, is the same pattern observed in Studies 1 and 2.a. This is
consistent with the general hypothesis that moral outrage makes a significant unique
contribution to the compensation of norm violation victims.

General Discussion
Taken together, these studies begin to reveal a richer landscape of emotional
determinants of victim compensation than was previously identified. Studies 1 and 2.a
found that on both the trait and state levels, moral outrage was associated with a
willingness to compensate victims of social norm violations beyond the effect of empathic
concern. In fact, when we controlled for moral outrage, or directly manipulated empathic
concern, the data revealed no significant effect of empathic concern on the compensation
of victims of social norm violations.
Also as predicted, the effect of moral outrage on compensation appears to be domain
specific. We found no significant relationship between a propensity to feel moral outrage
and willingness to compensate when a loss was due to chance or a bad investment in
Study 1. Despite finding significant differences in willingness to compensate in both the
chance and bad investment situations in Study 2.a, we found that moral outrage mediated
neither of these effects. This result was consistent with Study 1, suggesting that moral
outrage was not involved in driving compensation in these contexts.
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Our finding in Study 3 that increasing moral outrage did not increase compensation in the
norm violation context contrast with the pattern of results in Studies 1 and 2.a. One
possible explanation for this discrepancy was the change in dependent measure. Whereas
Studies 1 and 2 measured the most one is willing to pay to restore the investor to $10
(effectively measuring the lowest compensation trade-off ratio the third party is willing to
accept), Study 3 measured the amount the trustee chose to transfer. The latter is at least
partially determined by the amount a participant feels is the correct amount to transfer
rather than the degree to which they want the recipient to get that amount. It is possible
that, while the degree to which one wants a recipient to get the correct amount is
influenced by moral outrage, the correct amount itself is not. Future work may assess this
by manipulating moral outrage and assessing its effect on willingness to pay to
compensate as compared to the amount one is willing to compensate. Despite this
inconsistent finding, even in this study we found that moral outrage, controlling for
empathic concern, correlated with compensation in the norm violation situation but not
the bad investment situation, consistent with the previous pattern of results.
An unexpected but interesting result emerged when evaluating the relationship between
empathic concern and compensation in the chance situation. In the bad investment
situation in both Studies 1 and 2.b, we found relationships between empathic concern and
willingness to compensate. However, in the chance situation, we found no such
relationships between compensation and empathic concern. Further work is required to
understand the distinguishing features between these two cases, and what other
emotional determinants may be driving compensation when losses are due to chance.
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At first glance, this general pattern of findings seems inconsistent with previous work
demonstrating a relationship between empathic concern and third party compensation of
those who receive low offers in a dictator game (Leliveld et al., 2012). However, there are
two possible ways to reconcile these findings. First, as reported in Study 1, there is a high
correlation between moral outrage and empathic concern, which points to the importance
of controlling for one to understand the influence of the other. As this previous work did
not include such controls, it is possible that moral outrage, as a latent third variable, may
account for the results. Second, other work has shown that people do not have strong
personal beliefs of what divisions one should make in the dictator game, which is critical
for the existence of a social norm (Bicchieri, 2006). As no norm may exist in the dictator
game situation, and therefore none may be violated, it would be reasonable for empathic
concern, rather than moral outrage, to motivate third parties to compensate.
This work was confined to artificial contexts using behavioral games. However, if the
results can be shown to generalize more broadly, it may help us better understand the
motivations for charitable giving, and therefore have implications for those soliciting such
donations. Previous studies have suggested empathic concern drives people both to
volunteer (Davis, et al., 1999) as well as engage in charitable giving (Bekkers, 2006). Our
results suggest that picture may be incomplete, and that the degree to which people are
motivated to help may be driven by different emotions in different contexts. Future work
may assess the degree to which moral outrage may be a motivating factor for volunteerism
and charitable giving when the target is the victim of a norm violation, and assess whether
messaging focusing on this theme in those contexts is effective.
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Finally, this work has focused on the proximate emotional determinants of victim
compensation. Researchers in evolutionary psychology have often seen emotions as
proxies for underlying cognitive systems (Fessler & Haley, 2003; Haidt, 2003). When two
separate emotions are shown to drive behavior in two different contexts, this suggests
different evolved mechanisms in play. By revealing a novel emotional motivator for the
prosocial compensation of norm violation victims, we are left with the question of what
mechanism drives this behavior, and what can we deduce about its ultimate origins.
Chapter 2 develops possible answers to these questions, and poses novel hypotheses by
which to test them. Chapter 3 carries out studies to test these hypotheses in order to
better understand the underlying mechanisms motivating the compensation of norm
violation victims.
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CHAPTER 2
The results from the studies in Chapter 1 provide a more fine-grained understanding of the
emotional motivations for compensatory behavior. Consistent with many previous studies,
we found that empathic concern for the victim drove compensation in some contexts.
However, this was not as universal as previously reported. We found that when someone
experienced a loss due to the violation of a social norm, it was moral outrage, rather than
empathic concern, which drove third parties to compensate their loss.
Evolutionary theorists have addressed the question of why one might compensate
someone else’s loss. They have paid particular attention to the implication of diminishing
marginal fitness benefits of resources for the incentive to help (Nettle et al., 2011). The key
insight of these models is that, as one acquires more of a particular resource, the marginal
benefit of that resource tends to decrease. For example, the first calorie of perishable elk
meat provides significantly greater fitness benefit to the hunter than the 100,000th. This
creates a unique opportunity for cooperation over time. When the amount of resources
one acquires (or loses) varies over time, individuals can improve their overall fitness
outcomes by offsetting their losses with the excess from their gain periods. However, as
many resources are perishable or hard to defend in large quantities, it is costly if not
impossible to engage in this intertemporal offsetting within the individual. This creates a
cooperative context in which individuals would benefit if they were able to receive help
when they have relatively little, at the cost of giving help when they have relative excess.
Although this dynamic is to some degree applicable to all situations involving generous
behavior, it is particularly important in the context of the compensation of momentary
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victims. Taking the example of disease, anyone in a community could fall ill. Such a
situation creates a great momentary difference in the benefit of aid. While a fully healthy
adult would benefit little from what trivial help the ill person could provide at that
moment, the ill person may benefit dramatically by the aid of others. After one heals, she
may have the opportunity to offer such aid to another. It is precisely this boom-and-bust
in resources and need that create the fertile ground for the emergence of a cooperative
tendency to compensate victim’s losses, conditional on the mutual expectation that, if you
do so, you will be helped in a similar situation in the future.
While this dynamic demonstrates the unique cooperative opportunity presented in victim
compensation, it does not suggest a particular evolutionary solution. Theorists have
pointed to reciprocity, and indirect reciprocity in particular, as perhaps the force driving
the evolution of compensation (Nettle et al., 2011). They suggest that those who
compensate build up reputations as compensators, and when one experiences a loss,
others compensate that loss conditional on whether the present victim was a previous
compensator. Indeed, patterns outside the lab suggest that may be the case: in small scale
societies, those who are sick but have a good reputation for sharing in the past receive
particularly generous shares of food to compensate for their illness (Gurven, 2004).
The efficient helping hypothesis described above treats compensation as if it were the
result of a single evolved system, paying no attention to varying motivators across
contexts. However, the results of Chapter 1 suggest that compensation is driven by two
different emotions in two distinct contexts. Dating back to Darwin’s The Expression of
Emotions in Man and Animals (1872), evolutionary theorists have taken emotions as
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indicators of specific evolved mechanisms (Tooby & Cosmides, 2008; Fessler & Haley,
2003; Haidt, 2003). Under this framework, if compensation is driven by empathic concern
when losses are not intentionally inflicted, but moral outrage when losses are due to norm
violations, these must be driven by distinctly evolved systems. Of these two systems, the
efficient helping hypothesis best fits empathic concern-driven helping, as it is elicited
broadly by seeing one in need, rather than moral outrage driven compensation, which
would only be found when a norm the compensator cares about is violated (Haidt, 2003).
This therefore leaves a hole in the literature. If our best understanding of third party
compensation can explain empathic concern driven compensation, but cannot account for
moral outrage driven compensation, what led to its evolution?
As both social norm violation victim compensation and perpetrator punishment appear to
be driven by the same proximate emotion, namely moral outrage, we suggest that they are
both the outcome of a single underlying system. We therefore propose a social norm
violation response system, under which one emotion, moral outrage, motivates two linked
behaviors, violator punishment and victim compensation.
This chapter aims to provide an evolutionary account of this norm violation response
system generally, and norm violation victim compensation specifically. We do so in two
parts. In the first section, we review the existing literature on evolutionary models of
third-party punishment, with a particular focus on those which may be also be applicable
to victim compensation, including reputation and cultural group selection models. In the
second section, we expand these models to provide a novel evolutionary account of third
party compensation, to then be tested in Chapter 3.
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The Evolution of Third Party Punishment of Norm Violators
Cooperation among non-kin is a defining feature of human social life. However,
cooperation presents an evolutionary conundrum: if we understand evolution to favor
those who do what is in the interest of their inclusive fitness, how might it select for the
cooperative tendencies that appear so prevalent in human interaction? Many theorists
found punishment to be a suitable candidate for sustaining cooperation. Assuming the
probability of punishment multiplied by the cost to the perpetrator exceeds the benefit
derived from failing to cooperate, punishment does indeed incentivize cooperation.
However, punishment is less a solution to cooperation as it is another evolutionary
quandary. Punishment often has associated costs, whether they be the direct cost of
punishing, or the indirect costs of reprisal. This creates what is known as a second order
free-rider problem: punishment conveys the group level benefit of driving others to
cooperate, but this comes at the expense of the punisher, making punishment itself a
cooperative act in need of explanation.
A wide variety of models for the emergence of third-party punishment have been
proposed. However, all of these models are broadly based on either reputation or on
multilevel selection (Nowak, 2006). In this section, we review these two classes of models,
with a particular focus on those which will be built upon in the next section to propose an
evolutionary account of morally outraged compensation.

Reputation-Based Models of Punishment
Our understanding of the evolutionary benefits of reputational effects rests on our
understanding of costly signaling. Zahavi (1975) first used costly signaling to explain the
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evolution of the colorful plumage of the male peacock. As these large colorful tails are
biologically costly, one must ask how they could be selected for. Zahavi proposed that the
tails were selected for, precisely because only those who possessed hidden quality were
able to take on the cost of producing them. This created a correlation between plumage
and underlying quality. This correlation functioned as an honest signal, under which those
females who chose the males with more plumage gained mates of higher intrinsic quality,
thereby producing offspring of higher quality. This logic was concurrently formalized in
economics (Spence, 1973), showing that education could function as a signal of employee
quality, assuming that the opportunity cost was lower for those of high employee quality
than those of low. This model was generalized and returned to biology via evolutionary
game theory, showing that costly signaling was evolutionarily stable if those of high
intrinsic quality paid a lower cost to signal (or experienced a greater benefit) than those of
lower quality (Grafen, 1990). As generalized, costly signaling can play a part not only in
mate selection, but in any interaction when underlying traits are difficult to observe
(Miller, 2000).
Early modeling in the field showed that punishment can emerge and propagate when
one’s quality as a future interaction partner is correlated with the cost of publically
punishing (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 2001). This assumption
seems particularly reasonable when one considers the degree to which a dominant
individual’s position allows him to better withstand retaliation. However, under this
framing, punishment can sustain cooperative behavior by punishing defectors, but these
pressures also favor indiscriminate punishment, making it insufficient to explain the
specific targeting of free riders.
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Later reputation based models of punishment have broadly fallen into two categories:
punishment as a signal of willingness to punish transgressions against the punisher, and
punishment as a signal of a disposition supporting local norms. Models of the first case
have been primarily focused on second party punishment, meaning that the victim of the
transgression themselves punishes the perpetrator. Here we can see that developing a
reputation for being willing to punish deters future defection, and therefore reduces the
need for punishment (Johnstone & Bshary, 2004). This leads to somewhat paradoxical
finding that reputation based strategies lead to both an increased willingness to punish as
well as less punishing in equilibrium (McElreath, 2003). Importantly, these models differ
from many other explanations for the emergence of punishment in that their proliferation
is not due to, even indirectly, the benefits punishment conveys to others in the social
group, but rather by simply reducing the chances that the punisher himself is defected
against (Dos Santos, Rankin, & Wedekind, 2011). Although limited, experimenters have
found evidence consistent with the predictions of the punisher’s reputation as a deterrent
hypothesis. In a game in which participants could take money from one another as well as
punish those who took from them, participants chose to take less from those who
previously punished defectors in a cooperative dilemma (Barclay, Submitted).
The other primary thrust of the reputation literature has focused on the relationship
between punishment and the punisher’s commitment to the violated social norm. When
punishing the violation of a social norm, the punisher takes on a cost to express their own
underlying endorsement of the norm. If that endorsement also leads to their own
conformity with the norm, then punishers would make more reliable partners (Barclay,
2010). Raihani and Bshary (2015) similarly argue that, given that the punishment of
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defectors is itself cooperative, punishment can reveal and underlying cooperative
disposition. Although attractive in its simplicity, such an argument alone is insufficient to
justify an honest costly signal. For such a signal to emerge, there needs to be either a
differential cost or differential benefit for the punisher. Otherwise, the signal would be
just as effective for a defector to lure cooperative marks, eliminating any informative
value.
Some proposals have been put forth to address this shortcoming. Jordan et al. (2016)
develop an analytic model, showing that third-party punishment can indeed evolve as a
costly signal of norm conformity via partner choice in future interactions. Underlying this
model, the researchers assume that there is a correlation between the benefits of
punishment one might receive and the benefits of cooperation. The authors note that
punishing the perpetrator is beneficial to the victim, in that it deters future harm. As a
result, there is some probability of the victim reciprocating the actions of the punisher,
either through reward or by punishing someone who exploits the punisher (indeed,
experimental evidence shows that third party punishers are rewarded (Railhani & Bshary,
2015)). Importantly, this expected benefit is different for different individuals in the
population, who may be more or less likely to interact in the future than others. The
critical assumption then becomes that the probability of the future benefit of punishment
correlates with the probability of the future benefit of cooperation. This could be due to a
variety of reasons, such as how permanent a member of the community the person is or
their location in the structure of the population, both of which may affect the probability
with which they will repeatedly interact with the victim they punished on behalf of as well
as their past partners in cooperative dilemmas.
43

Another proposal put forward rests on the fact that if you are to punish the violator of a
social norm, you need to know that such a violation exists. Research from both the lab and
field demonstrates that the domains of cooperation varies dramatically between cultural
groups (Poppe, 2005; Cronk, 2007; Goerg & Walkowitz, 2010), even within the same
ecology (Henrich & Henrich, 2007). Although sometimes erroneously assumed otherwise,
ethnographic and historic studies of foragers show significant levels of fitness relevant
ephemeral interactions (Hill, et al., 2011). Incorporating a degree of psychological realism,
in such contexts, not all participants may know what norm may apply in a given situation
or if any norm applies at all. In this environment, when someone engages in punishment,
they are not only advertising their own endorsement of the norm, but also their
knowledge that a norm applies in this situation, what norm that is, and that it was
violated (Fessler & Haley, 2003). Here again we can see the possibility for a costly signal to
arise. Knowing that a norm exists in the local population is a pre-requisite for both
punishing a perpetrator as well as conforming to that norm yourself. Whereas people who
do not know what norms apply in the local context are at the risk of the extra cost of
punishing when no norm applies, and incurring more retribution as the punishment
would be seen as unwarranted, those who do know what norm applies can efficiently
signal their knowledge by only applying punishment when a norm is applicable. Similarly,
those with knowledge of when particular norms are in play can efficiently cooperate
conditional on whether the local ecology requires them to, and free-ride when it does not.
The relationship between being able to both selectively punish and selectively cooperate
in only the right contexts creates the correlation necessary for the emergence of an
effective costly signal.
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If such a pressure were in play, where punishment indicates knowledge of the relevant
norm, we would expect those who punish to be chosen as cooperative partners. Indeed, a
preference for punishers as cooperative partners has been demonstrated in multiple
experimental contexts (Barclay, 2006; Jordan et al., 2016). This model would also predict
that those who are more confident at what norm applies would be willing to pay more to
punish, and that this willingness would serve as an even stronger signal. And indeed,
experiments show that the more one is willing to pay to punish, the more they are
preferred as an interaction partner in a future cooperative interaction (Nelissen, 2008).

Group Selection and Cultural Learning Models of Punishment
Models discussed in the previous section have focused exclusively on interactions within a
group. However, selection can occur at multiple nested levels, both within groups as well
as between groups. Group selection is a particularly important level of analysis when there
is significant between group variation accompanied by within group similarity. In such
cases, selection at the group level can be a stronger force than selection at the individual
level, favoring the selection for group beneficial traits despite them being individually
costly within the group.
A critical insight of group selection modelers rests in the understanding that although
both cooperation and the punishing of defectors are cooperative dilemmas, group
composition affects their relative cost quite differently (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson,
2003). Cooperating among a group of defectors is not necessarily any more costly than
cooperating within a group of cooperators. For example, the cost of contributing to a
public good is constant, whether or not others choose to contribute. However, the cost of
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punishment is directly linked with the prevalence of cooperators. When few cooperators
are present, nearly every interaction would mandate punishment, making it incredibly
costly. However, when few defectors are present, compensation is rarely called for, making
it particularly cheap. A cooperative group without punishment therefore has a particularly
acute within group selection pressure against cooperation, meaning that if group selection
where to maintain cooperation, the between group pressure to cooperate would need to
be particularly large. This can be contrasted with a cooperative group with punishment, in
which there is minimal selection pressure to defect (as you would be punished) as well as
minimal pressure against punishment (as defection is quite rare). This low degree of
within group costs means that the between group pressures need not be particularly
strong to sustain pro-social punishment, thereby sustaining cooperation.
It is important to point out that even within such dynamics favoring between group
selection, cooperation and punishment are not necessarily evolutionarily stable (Boyd et
al., 2003). In addition, many models of this type either implicitly or explicitly take this
between group selection to be genetic. Genetic group selection requires sufficient genetic
between group differences for selection to act upon (Bowles, 2006). These would require
significant differences between neighboring communities, maintained through almost
entirely endogamous marriage and minimal migration. However, ethnographic evidence
suggests behaviorally this is not the case, consistent with the genetic evidence showing
insufficient differences between neighboring communities to support genetic group
selection (Hill, et al., 2011; Langergraber, et al., 2011).
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Cultural group selection models, coupled with an understanding of culture-gene
coevolution, address many of these shortcomings. Cultural group selection suggests that
the frequency of culturally transmitted components of an individual’s phenotype is
affected to some degree by the feature’s effect on the proliferation of a cultural group
(Chudek & Henrich, 2011). Relatedly, culture-gene coevolution proposes that cultural and
genetic evolution interact, each creating novel selection pressures for the other. Unlike
alleles, variation in cultural norms tends to be between, rather than within, communities
(Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011). And unlike genetic group selection, migration need
not undermine, and can in fact bolster, the effects of cultural group selection, providing
an opportunity for the migrant to adopt the norms of the local community (Boyd &
Richerson, 2009). Culture-gene coevolution also provides a psychologically richer account
of genetically acquired cultural learning mechanisms, such as conformity biased learning,
which can solve the stabilization problem experienced by genetic group selection models
(Henrich & Boyd, 2001).
The culture-gene coevolution account of cooperative norms and their enforcement begins
with humans’ adaptation to acquire what is known as cumulative culture: information that
could not have been acquired by one individual in a single generation. Cumulative culture,
as opposed to cultural information that one could develop within a generation, is one of
the earliest distinctive elements of psychology so far known to only be present in humans
(Boyd & Richerson, 1996). The advent of cumulative culture created a unique genetic
selection pressure; those with the cognitive capacity to best acquire this fitness relevant
cultural information were better able to survive and reproduce. As genetic evolution
pushed the population to be able to obtain greater amounts of cultural information, this
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allowed for the development of more complex content, effectively creating a ratcheting
effect; with the developing of cultural information selecting for those better able to
acquire and store it, and this adaptation allowing for more advanced information, thereby
creating an even stronger pressure to acquire it (Tennie, Call, & Tormasello, 2009).
By this account, culture-gene coevolution led to the development of a variety of social
learning strategies (Rendell, et al., 2011). These strategies include selectively following
those who are successful or prestigious, as well as generally conforming to what those
around you are doing (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Kendal, Giraldeau, & Laland, 2009).
These cultural learning strategies lead to phenotypic assortment: being more similar to
those within your group than the population average. Importantly, this leads to a variety
of within community stable equilibria. With a high degree of within group homogeneity
and between group heterogeneity, cultural group selection serves as an equilibrium
selection mechanism, favoring those groups with cooperative norms. Critical for the
explanation of sanctioning, these cultural learning strategies such as conformity biased
learning, can serve as a sufficient stabilization device to make punishing non-cooperators
an evolutionarily stable strategy (Henrich & Boyd, 2001; Guzman, Rodriguez-Sickert, &
Rowthorn, 2007).
Differences in social norms across different contexts and communities, as well as others’
willingness to punish violations of these norms, creates a novel evolutionary pressure to
quickly learn the social norms of a given community. This can lead to novel social learning
strategies specifically attuned to responses to social norm violations, such as punishment.
Punishment therefore takes on an additional role, not only directly stabilizing norms
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within a community with deterrence, but also educating observers as to what is and is not
acceptable, giving punishment value as information (Cushman, 2013). In the cultural
group selection paradigm, we therefore expect individuals in groups who punish to do
better than those who do not, not only because punishment directly stabilizes local
cooperative norms, but also because it indirectly stabilizes them by conveying the
normative beliefs of the members.

The Evolution of Third Party Compensation of Norm Violation Victims
We propose a unified social norm violation response system, which detects violations of
relevant norms, elicits an emotional response of moral outrage, and results in multiple
behavioral response patterns, including both the punishment of perpetrators and the
compensation of victims. Given that both punishment and compensation are proposed to
be the result of this single evolved system, these behaviors must also have been shaped by
some of the same underlying selection pressures. In this section, we evaluate what models
for the evolution of punishment may also be applicable to compensation, in order to make
a novel extension by expanding them to explain the emergence of a social norm violation
response system which includes victim compensation.
In order to best describe the proposed evolutionary account of compensation of norm
violation victims, it is important to first have a framework to understand social norms. To
this end, we use the concepts developed in Bicchieri’s (2006) social norms theory. Under
this framework, a social norm is a rule of behavior which people prefer to follow, on the
condition that they think a sufficient number of other people follow the rule, and that a
sufficient number of other people think that they should follow the rule. What one
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believes other people do is referred to as her empirical expectations, whereas what one
believes other people think she should do is termed her normative expectations. It is
important to note that one’s conformity to the social norm is conditional on whether one
has sufficient empirical and normative expectations, a prediction born out experimentally
(Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009).
One common element of both reputation based models as well as cultural group selection
models is that the punishment of a violator signals the punisher’s belief that one should
not violate this particular norm. Under these models, punishment therefore serves the
function of increasing the normative expectations of observers that the punisher endorses
the violated norm. However, simply increasing the normative expectations of observers is
not in and of itself an evolutionary explanation. Under reputation-based models,
increasing the normative expectations of observers might be evolutionarily relevant by
demonstrating that you are a resident of the community and understand the norms of the
local ecology, thereby making you a preferable partner in future interaction. Under
cultural group selection models, increasing the normative expectations of observers, who
have evolved a norm psychology to specifically learn and conform to beliefs about what
others think they should do, stabilizes local norms, allowing for between group selection
to promote the proliferation of members of groups which stabilize cooperative norms
through punishment.
We believe the general claim that punishment serves as an indicator of one’s personal
beliefs about what people should do, as well as the specific reputational and cultural group
selection models outlined above, could also apply to the compensation of norm violation
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victims. In the following sections, we describe how those proposals could be expanded to
account for compensation, allowing for the development of testable predictions assessed
in Chapter 3.

The Norm Broadcasting Hypothesis
Across both reputation and cultural group selection models of punishment, punishment
does not only serve a deterrent function, but also functions to convey information. By
punishing the violator of a social norm, one reveals his own normative beliefs. This
revelation can signal that the punisher is aware of the relevant norms in a particular
context and therefore capable of conforming (Fessler & Haley, 2003), or as a direct
indicator of endorsement and cooperative intent (Jordan et al., 2016).
Cultural group selection models also use punishment to convey information, albeit for a
different underlying rationale. Culture-gene coevolution accounts of norm psychology
posit a suite of adaptations for both signaling and receiving signals of local norms (Chudek
& Henrich, 2011). Punishment therefore directly stabilizes social norms through
deterrence, but also indirectly by conveying the local norms, signals that others are
predisposed to follow (Cushman, 2013).
Similar to punishment, compensation could function to signal the third parties normative
beliefs concerning the violated norm. Unlike cheap talk, compensation parallels
punishment in that it is directly costly to the third party, giving credibility to the signal.
Although both punishment and compensation convey information, compensation does
not have the direct deterrent effect of punishment, which might lead one to wonder how a
system would emerge to signal via both compensation and punishment, when punishment
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has a clear additional benefit. While compensation lacks a direct deterrent effect, it has
unique benefits over punishment, making the two signals complementary. When a norm
violation occurs, it is not always clear who committed the violation. If one could only avail
themselves to punishment, they would have no opportunity to signal their endorsement of
the norm. Assuming that victims are more readily available than perpetrators, or at least
available in different situations, compensation has unique benefits. Consistent with this
understanding, experiments have shown that when the perpetrator is unavailable for
punishment, third parties are more willing to compensate their victim (Chavez &
Bicchieri, 2013; Jordan et al., 2016). And although compensation may carry more upfront
costs to the third party than punishment (Baron, 2007), it also does not carry
punishment’s downstream risk of retaliation (Chagnon, 1988; Cinyabuguma et al., 2006;
Nikiforakis, 2008; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Punishment and compensation can therefore
complement one another while serving the same underlying function.
Based on this reasoning, we propose the norm broadcasting hypothesis: the function of
compensating the victim of a social norm violation is to signal the compensator’s
endorsement of the violated norm. This hypothesis is not, however, an evolutionary one. To
be so, we would need to explain how a third party derives fitness benefits from signaling
their endorsement of the violated norm. In the following two sections we provide two
candidates for such an explanation, the first based on the reputation models of
punishment, and the second based on the cultural group selection accounts. It is
important to note that neither of these two proposals are mutually exclusive. It could be
the case that both reputational concerns and cultural group selection jointly explain the
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compensation of norm violation victims, or either individually. Between these possible
combinations, we are agnostic.

The Reputation Signaling Hypothesis
Reputation based explanations for punishment broadly fell into two camps. The first was
that individuals developed a reputation as a punisher in order to deter future defection
against themselves (Johnstone & Bshary, 2004; Dos Santos et al., 2011). The second was
that people punish to build a reputation as someone who is embedded in the local social
community and knows and endorses the local social norms, thereby improving their
perceived quality as a future partner (Jordan et al., 2016; Fessler & Haley, 2003). As
compensation does not provide a direct deterrent effect, it is not obvious how the models
in which building a reputation as a punisher deters future defections against you could be
extended to account for compensation. One possibility points to the fact that when the
perpetrator is unknown, compensation serves as a substitute signal. This would mean that
while compensation is not itself a deterrent, if it is correlated with a willingness to punish,
it could indirectly build one’s reputation as a punisher. Experimental results do suggest
that a willingness to punish is correlated with a willingness to compensate (Jordan et al.,
2016), consistent with this speculative hypothesis.
However, we find the models under which one punishes in order to indicate their
membership in a community and knowledge of local social norms to more naturally lend
themselves to also explaining victim compensation. Jordan et al. (2016) showed how
punishment could evolve as a signal of one’s trustworthiness, due to the correlation
between future benefit of punishment and the future benefit of cooperation. This is
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because the benefit of each is partially determined by how transient they are in a
population. When you reside within a community permanently, you are more likely to
benefit from having punished on someone else’s behalf through the reciprocity of them
being willing to punish on your behalf, thereby deterring those who might otherwise
exploit you. Similarly, if you are a permanent resident, you would also be more likely to
benefit from repeated cooperative interaction. This correlation in benefits allows
punishment to be a costly signal of cooperative intent.
This same signaling argument can be expanded to account for compensation. If you
compensate on someone’s behalf, you are more likely to benefit from their reciprocated
compensation in the future if you reside within that community. Similarly, if you
cooperate with someone, you are more likely to benefit from their continued willingness
to interact with you if you are in the same community. Therefore the relative benefits of
compensation are correlated with those of cooperation, leading to compensation serving
as a truthful signal of willingness to cooperate. Given that, we would expect others who
are looking for partners in a cooperative dilemma to be attuned to candidates’ reputation
for compensation.
In addition to the probability of future interaction, punishment can signal one’s
knowledge of the norms within a local community (Fessler & Haley, 2003). This
explanation hinges on the fact that social norms for the same situation can differ
dramatically from one community to another, even within the same ecology (Cronk, 2007;
Goerg & Walkowitz, 2010; Henrich & Henrich, 2007; Poppe, 2005). It would be incredibly
individually costly to cooperate in every situation where a cooperative norm could apply.
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Similarly, it would be overwhelmingly costly to punish free-riders in every such situation.
However, if one knows the local norms, one can cooperate and punish at much lower
frequency, and even at higher individual cost, while not risking needless cooperation or
being punished. This creates the correlation necessary for a truthful costly signal:
cooperating is relatively less costly for those who know the local norms, as they need only
to cooperate in the specific situations dictated by the norms of that community. Similarly,
punishment is less costly for those who know the local norms, as they need only do so
when a norm of that specific community is violated. This leads to the punishment of local
norm violations functioning as costly signal of conformity to local norms.
This logic can be directly expanded to include compensation as well as punishment.
Compensating the victims of all free-riders is far more costly than only compensating
those who were the victim of a social norm violation, as deemed by the local community.
This results in the same correlation as described above for punishment, between the
relative cost of compensation and the relative cost of punishment. This correlation allows
for compensation of the victims of local norm violations to serve as a costly signal of
conformity to those local norms. From this logic, we expect a downstream consequence to
be that those in search of a cooperative partner to be attuned to candidates’ compensatory
reputation. Taking these possible accounts for the emergence of compensatory behavior,
we propose the reputation signaling hypothesis: compensators signal their status as a
member of the community and their knowledge and support for local norms, leading
observers to prefer interacting with the compensator in the future.
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The Norm Stabilization Hypothesis
Group selection accounts allow for selection not only between individuals, but also
between groups. Looking at both these levels, we can see that within a group, if there is a
high willingness to punish, this entails low levels of defection, meaning that punishment
will rarely be used. This results in the within group selection pressure against punishment
being weak. This can be contrasted with the strong between group pressure when
punishment has stabilized cooperation in one group and not another, making between
group selection pressures particularly relevant in the domain of cooperation and
punishment. Culture-gene coevolution models come from the realization that, due to
human’s unique ability to acquire cumulative culture, solely genetic explanations may be
insufficient to properly understand the dynamics of human cooperation, including thirdparty punishment. By their account, the emergence of cumulative culture created a
genetic selection pressure to effectively acquire that information, which resulted in a suite
of cultural learning strategies such as conformity and imitation (Rendell, et al., 2011). The
bias in these cultural learning strategies can be sufficient to counteract the weak selection
pressure against punishment within groups (Henrich & Boyd, 2001).
Movement between and interaction with other cultural groups, as is prevalent in hunter
gatherer cultures today (Hill, et al., 2011), creates a strong pressure to learn what social
norms were endorsed by the local community to avoid the previously established
punishment. Punishment can therefore serve not only as a direct stabilization device of
local norms, but also as a teaching tool (Cushman, 2013), counteracting the normative
expectation reducing effect of having observed someone violate a local norm, thereby
stabilizing the norm at precisely the time when it might otherwise be undermined.
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Unlike punishment, victim compensation does not provide a direct deterrent effect.
However, if people have developed a suite of cognitive tools specifically to acquire local
social norms, then compensation could plausibly serve a similar teaching function. Just
like punishment, compensation is costly. Therefore there would only be selection for one
to compensate (or punish) if there is in fact a social norm in the community that the
compensator (or punisher) would benefit from the stabilization of. As the benefit of
compensation is correlated with there actually being a relevant social norm, compensation
can function as an effective costly signal of local norms. Given the previously discussed
evolved psychology for acquiring and complying with local norms, we would then expect
that observing compensation would induce observers to comply, thereby stabilizing the
violated norm. From this logic we develop the norm stabilization hypothesis:
Compensators signal their normative belief that one should not violate the norm, inducing
observers to comply with the norm, increasing its stability.
The norm broadcasting, reputation signaling, and norm stabilization hypotheses are novel
accounts for the functional underpinnings of the compensation of the victims of norm
violations. As we based these accounts on expanding evolutionary models of punishment
of norm violators, they allow us to start to speak of a unified evolutionary account of third
party response to the violation of social norms, consistent with our understanding of the
proximate emotional motivators established in Chapter 1. In Chapter 3, we take each of
these three hypotheses and derive previously untested predictions. We then
experimentally test those predictions to build an empirical understanding of what
selection pressured may have resulted in this norm violation response system.
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CHAPTER 3
Chapter 1 provided evidence for a finer-grained picture of the emotional motivations for
compensation. While previous research had taken empathic concern broadly as the
primary motivator for compensatory helping behavior, our work showed that, in the case
of a social norm violation, moral outrage drove third parties to compensate.
As emotional states can taken as indicators of the underlying psychological mechanism at
play (Fessler & Haley, 2003; Haidt, 2003), third party compensation being motivated by
empathic concern in some contexts, but by moral outrage in the case of norm violations,
would therefore suggest that these behaviors are driven by distinct underlying
mechanisms. The disassociation between the mechanism underlying the compensation of
norm violation victims and compensation in other contexts presents an evolutionary
puzzle. If both forms of compensation arose from the same pressures, we would not
expect distinct psychological mechanisms. Therefore, the explanation for empathic
compensation, centering on the indirect reciprocity benefits of efficient transfer of goods
to those in need (ex. Nettle et al., 2011), cannot provide the evolutionary rationale for the
morally outraged compensation of the victim of a social norm violation. It is this puzzle
which motivates this chapter: what led to the evolution of third party compensation of
norm violation victims?
Whereas the anger underlying the compensation of victims of norm violations is different
than the emotions motivating compensation in other contexts, it coincides with the
emotional antecedents of punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Jordan et al., 2017;
Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). This suggests that the compensation of norm violation
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victims may be more closely related to the punishment of norm violation perpetrators than
it is to other types of compensation. Given these similarities at the emotional level, we
might also look to the similarities at the cognitive level. Just as punishment has been
shown to be driven by the desire to right a moral wrong (Carlsmith, 2006), the
compensation of a victim can achieve the same fairness restoring goal, but in the domain
of the victim rather than the perpetrator.
And although compensation cannot provide the same deterrent function as punishment,
it could plausibly serve similarly as a signaling device, revealing the compensator’s
endorsement of the norm. Compensation rather than punishment has the added benefit
of not incurring the risk of retaliation from the punished perpetrator, a fear justified in
both the lab and field (Chagnon, 1988; Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Nikiforakis, 2008;
Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). In addition, compensating victims, rather than rewarding
compliers, shares the positive trait with punishment of, when the norm is stable and
compliance is high, being unnecessary and therefore low cost (Oliver, 1980).
Based on the similarities in both motivation and plausible cognitive rationale between
punishment and victim compensation, we propose the norm broadcasting hypothesis: the
function of compensating the victim of a social norm violation is to signal the compensator’s
endorsement of the violated norm. This logic parallels that of some evolutionary models of
punishment, which suggest that punishment may serve as a signal to both the punished
individual as well as those observing (Barclay, 2006; Cushman, 2013; Jordan et al., 2016;
Kurzban et al., 2007). However, from an evolutionary prospective, this logic alone is
insufficient, as it does not explain how the compensator derives net fitness benefits from
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their costly signaling of their endorsement of the violated norm, a necessary condition for
such disposition to have evolved.
For this, we propose two candidate hypotheses, between which we are agnostic, both of
which could be simultaneously contributing to the emergence of the compensation of
norm violation victims. We first have the reputation signaling hypothesis: compensators
signal their status as a member of the community and their knowledge and support for local
norms, leading observers to prefer interacting with the compensator in the future. This
proposal closely mirrors the argument found in indirect reciprocity models of third-party
punishment, which propose that punishing builds one’s reputation as a quality partner
(Barclay, 2006; Jordan et al., 2016).
Our second candidate is the norm stabilization hypothesis: compensators signal their
normative belief that one should not violate the norm, inducing observers to comply with the
norm, increasing its stability. Assuming the norm in question is a cooperative norm, the
stabilization of the norm benefits the compensator by increasing the probability of future
interactions being cooperative. The norm stabilization hypothesis hinges on our
understanding of the psychological determinants of norm compliance. Previous work
demonstrates that individuals conform to a norm only if they believe that a sufficient
number of other people conform (empirical expectations) and that they believe that a
sufficient amount of others think they ought to conform (normative expectations)
(Bicchieri & Chavez, 2010; Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009). Previous studies have shown that when
people witness the violation of a social norm, it decreases their relevant normative
expectations, leading the observer to be more willing to violate the norm themselves
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(Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009). The norm stabilization hypothesis therefore posits that a third
party can send a costly signal that they do in fact endorse the social norm, thereby
providing reinforcement of the norm in the eyes of observers. Similar proposals have been
made to explain the emergence of third-party punishment, in which punishment is taken
as a teaching tool, informing both the punished and those observing of what is acceptable
behavior (Cushman, 2013).
There are currently no other evolutionary models designed to explain a compensation
system which is engaged specifically in the case of a norm violation. Therefore, we did not
design the studies in this chapter to pit the predictions of our hypothesis against those in
the literature. Instead, we attempted to test the norm broadcasting, reputation signaling,
and norm stabilization hypotheses by determining novel downstream predictions under
each, and testing those predictions.
In Study 4, we investigated the general norm broadcasting hypothesis, which posits that
the function of compensation is to serve as a costly signal of the compensator’s
endorsement of the norm. As in any signaling system, the efficiency of such a system is
entirely dependent on others receiving that signal. We therefore posited that if victim
compensation did arise in order to signal the compensator’s endorsement of the norm,
one’s willingness to compensate would be moderated by the number of people who
observe that compensation. We tested this prediction by having participants take part in a
third party trust game. In the role of the third party, participants decided whether to, in
the case of the investor receiving no money due to the trustees’ violation of a reciprocity
norm, pay $5 of their own endowment to restore the investor to their original $15
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endowment. All participants were assigned to either the public or private condition, where
their choice was either revealed to a group of disinterested observers or kept private.
Under the norm broadcasting hypothesis, we expected more participants to be willing to
compensate when their choice was observed. Although no such effect has previously been
investigated in the domain of victim compensation, the mirrored effect in punishment has
been found, in which being observed increases third party’s propensity to engage in the
costly punishment of norm violators (Kurzban et al., 2007).
Study 5 investigated the predictions of the norm stabilization hypothesis. The norm
stabilization hypothesis suggests that the signaling of one’s endorsement of the violated
norm through compensation functions to mitigate the norm undermining effect of
witnessing a violation, increasing the probability that the norm is maintained. This
hypothesis relies on the logic that if one witnesses the compensation, this increases that
person’s normative expectation that other people believe one ought to follow the norm,
which increases their own compliance. In Study 5, we tested the prediction of the norm
stabilization hypothesis that observing compensation increases the observers’ propensity
to conform to the norm. Participants were assigned to the role of a trustee in a trust game.
Before making their choice as a trustee, participants were shown summary statistics of
other participants in a third party trust game. Participants in the High Compensation
condition were shown high levels of compensation by third parties, whereas participants
in the Low Compensation condition were shown low levels of compensation. Under the
norm stabilization hypothesis, we predicted that witnessing high levels of compensation
would lead trustees to be more likely to comply with the reciprocity norm, and that this
effect would be mediated by their normative expectation. Similar effects have previously
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been shown in the punishment domain. There we have seen that when one is punished for
violating a norm they are more likely to cooperate (Fehr & Gachter, 2000), even when
punishment is no longer present (Stagnaro, Arechar, & Rand, 2017), and that having
witnessed someone else be punished can have an even stronger effect than having been
punished yourself (Barr, 2001).
Finally, in Study 6, we test predictions of the reputation signaling hypothesis. Under this
hypothesis, people use compensation as a costly signal of their membership in the local
community and knowledge of the relevant local norm in order to increase their
attractiveness as a partner in future interactions where the same norm applies. In order to
assess the reputation signaling hypothesis, we therefore chose to test the prediction that
observers do in fact prefer to interact with those who previously compensated.
Participants in this study were told that they were to assume the role of an investor in a
trust game. They were then shown a set of possible trustees, all who had acted pro-socially
in a previous interaction, but only one of which had compensated the victim in a third
party trust game. Under the reputation signaling hypothesis, we predicted that people
would be more likely to select the compensator. Similar effects to that proposed here have
been observed in the punishment domain, showing people to prefer punishers over nonpunishers in future interactions (Barclay, 2006; Jordan et al., 2016).

Study 4
A key principle of the general signaling hypothesis is that compensation functions to
transmit information to those observing the act. This leads to the prediction that possible
compensators should be attuned to the degree to which their compensation is observable
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(and therefore a more or less effective signal). Specifically, this leads to the hypothesis that
third parties should be more willing to compensate the victims of a norm violation when
that choice to compensate is made publicly. This study tested that proposition.
Participants took part in a trust game with third party compensation. Using the strategy
method, each participant fully described what they would do in each role of the game,
including whether or not they would compensate an investor who lost their endowment
due to the norm violation of the trustee. Each participant was then randomly assigned to
one of the three roles, and their decision was carried out. Critically, participants were
divided into either a Public or Private condition. In the Public condition, all participants
were required to state their decision aloud, whereas in the Private condition, their choices
were left undisclosed. We predicted that, consistent with the norm signaling hypothesis,
that third parties would compensate significantly more if they knew they would make
their decision publicly.

Method
We recruited 153 participants (45 men, mean age of 21) from the PLEEP subject pool to
participate in this study. The PLEEP subject pool consists of student and staff members of
the University of Pennsylvania who have enrolled to receive notification of studies
occurring on campus.
Participants were invited to the lab in groups of 10 to 16 across 12 sessions. All participants
were paid a show-up fee of $5. Each participant then read a description of a third party
trust game, similar to that used in the norm violation situation in Study 1. The investor
was endowed with an additional $10, the trustee with $0, and the third party with $15. The
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investor could choose to either keep the $10 or transfer the entire amount to the trustee. If
the investor chose to transfer, the experimenter tripled the amount to $30. The trustee
could then chose to either keep the entire $30, or transfer $15 of the $30 back to the
investor. Finally, if the trustee chose to keep the entire $30, the third party could choose to
either keep their entire $15, or to transfer $5 to the investor. If the third party chose to
transfer $5 to the investor, the experimenter doubled this amount to $10. The options
available in each role were common knowledge to all participants.
Before knowing their role in the interaction, each participant chose what they would do if
assigned to each of the three roles (i.e. each participant said, as the investor, whether they
would transfer the money; as the trustee, whether they would return the money if
transferred to them; and as the third party, whether they would pay to compensate the
investor if the money was not returned to them). This commitment was final, and could
not be changed later in the session.
The experimenter informed participants that there were multiple sessions of the
experiment, and that each session was assigned to a particular role (i.e. the entire session
would be either investors, trustees, or third parties). In addition, each session was
randomly assigned to be either Public or Private. In the Public condition, subjects were
informed that after making their decisions and being assigned to a role, they would
verbally announce their choice to the experimenter and other members of the session.
Previous studies have used this technique successfully the manipulate audience effects in
behavioral games (Chavez & Bicchieri, 2013; Kurzban et al., 2007).

65

We chose the method of soliciting choices for all roles from each participant and then
assigning the entire session to a particular role for two reasons. First, soliciting choices
from each participant for all roles made efficient use of subject responses, as we only
analyzed the responses for the role of the third party. To reduce spill over between
responses across roles, we solicited responses for the role of the third party before the two
other roles. Second, assigning the entire session to a particular role rather than assigning
each individual was designed to reduce the demand effect of having to publicly declare
one’s choice to the affected individual. The signaling hypotheses does not require that
those observing be in any way involved in the particular exchange, so this method
provided a stronger test, as all participants in any given session were by design not
interacting with each other, as they were all assigned to the same role. After all sessions
were complete, participants were matched with one another, and notified that they could
pick up any additional earnings.

Results
All participants correctly responded to the four comprehension questions and were
included in the analysis.
Proportions of participants who chose to compensate for the Public and Private conditions
can be found in Figure 5. We found that a significantly higher percentage of participants
in the Public condition (76.7%) than in the Private condition (38.8%) chose to compensate
X2(1, N=153)=20.9, p<.001.
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Figure 5. Percentage of participants who choose to pay $5 to
compensate investor in the public versus private condition, error
bars as 95% confidence intervals

Discussion
The general norm broadcasting hypothesis sees compensation as functioning to broadcast
the beliefs of the compensator. The effectiveness of broadcasting is proportional to the
size of the audience. We therefore expected, if compensation functions as suggested, for it
to be attuned to whether or not an audience is present. Here we find support for this
prediction, with participants randomly assigned to the Public condition compensating
significantly more than those assigned to the Private condition.

Study 5
This study, along with Study 6, begin to disentangle the alternative justifications for the
norm broadcasting hypothesis: the norm stabilization hypothesis and the reputation
signaling hypothesis. In this study, we focused on predictions made by the norm
stabilization hypothesis, which argues that compensation broadcasts one’s endorsement
of a norm, which in turn limits the destabilizing effect of a norm violation, and increases
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relative conformity. Bicchieri’s (2006) theory of social norms proposes that one condition
for social norm conformity is that a sufficient number of relevant others think that one
should conform. Previous work shows people to in fact have such conditional preferences
for norm conformity (Bicchieri & Chavez, 2010; Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009). We propose that
compensation can broadcast those expectations, thereby serving as a form of
“psychological deterrence” due to people’s conditional preference for norm conformity.2
In order to test the prediction of the norm stabilization hypothesis, participants were
shown summary statistics of other peoples’ past behavior in a third party trust game. They
were told the proportion of investors who invested, the proportion of trustees who
returned the funds if invested, and the proportion of third parties who were willing to pay
to restore the investor to their original endowment if the trustee kept the entire transfer.
Participants were assigned to either the High or Low Compensation condition. In both
conditions, subjects were shown summary statistics of select cases, showing moderately
high rates of investment and return. In the Low Compensation condition, participants
were shown the summary statistics of select cases in which a low proportion of third
parties compensated, whereas participants in the High compensation condition were
shown summary statistics from select cases in which a high proportion of third parties
compensated. Participants then took part in a trust game themselves, with no third party.
This study tested the prediction of the norm stabilization hypothesis that trustees who

2

It is important to note here the similarities and differences between punishment and
compensation. Unlike compensation, punishment has an immediate materially deterrent effect.
However, punishment and compensation are similar in that they both signal the expectations of
the third party. This allows the third party to honor the norm in a costly manner, thereby signaling
their own endorsement of the norm with minimal threat of reprisal.
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observe high rates of compensation would be more likely to conform to the norm by
returning half the funds back to the investor. As a secondary prediction, the norm
stabilization hypothesis also predicts that it is through the path of increasing normative
expectations, the belief that other people think you should conform to the norm, that high
levels of compensation lead to greater norm conformity.

Method
We recruited 1098 participants (543 men, mean age of 36) from the AMT platform to
participate in this study.
We divided this study into two phases. In Phase 1, participants read a description of a
simplified trust game with third party compensation. The investor received an initial
endowment of $0.50 the trustee $0.00, and the third party $0.75. If the investor chose to
transfer to the trustee, their transfer of $0.50 was tripled to $1.50. The trustee then chooses
whether to keep the entire $1.50 or to send half ($0.75) back to the investor. If the trustee
chose to keep the entire sum, the third party had the option to pay $0.25 to restore the
investor to $0.50. All options for all roles were common knowledge. Participants were then
randomly assigned to one of these three roles, and made their choice for that role. We ran
participants in Phase 1 until we had a proper mix of example participants to use in Phase 2.
This meant running participants until at least 1 investor chose to invest, at least 1 investor
chose not to invest, at least 3 trustees chose to return the money, at least 1 trustee chose
not to return the money, at least 9 third parties chose to compensate, and at least 9 chose
not to compensate. After these conditions were met, we moved on to Phase 2.
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In Phase 2, participants were shown the third party trust game described above. They were
then shown what was described to them as “a sample of the results” of previous
participants. How that sample was constructed was not described. The sample was taken
from Phase 1, chosen such that every subject was shown that 50% of investors chose to
transfer, and 75% of trustees chose to return. However, the proportion of third parties
who chose to compensate was manipulated through a selection of cases from Phase 1.
Specifically, in the high compensation condition, subjects were shown a sample in which
90% of third parties chose to compensate the investor, whereas in the Low Compensation
condition subjects were shown a sample in which only 10% of subjects chose to
compensate the investor.3 All three statistics, rather than only the proportion of third
parties who compensated, were shown in order to reduce any demand effect and provide a
particularly strong test of the hypothesis.
After each participant viewed the summary statistics described above, they were then
given the opportunity to play a trust game themselves, similar to that played in Phase 1,
but with no third party. Before telling participants which role they would take in the
game, we employed the strategy method so that all participants committed to their
choices for both roles before being told which role they would actually take. In order to
reduce spillover effects, all participants chose what they would do as the recipient first.

3

Previous studies have used similar methods of deliberate rather than random selection to
manipulate information through the use of an ambiguous prompt such that they can deliver
consistent stimuli while maintaining non-deception (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009; Charness, Naef, &
Sontuoso, 2016).
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After making their choices for the interaction, all participants were asked what their
personal normative belief and normative expectations were concerning the actions of the
trustee in their interaction. We measured personal normative belief by asking participants
if they “thought it was wrong for Person B to keep the $1.50”. We measured normative
expectation, one’s belief about the personal normative beliefs of others (Bicchieri, 2006),
by asking “Out of 10 participants in this study, how many do you think said it was wrong
for Person B to keep $1.50”.

Results
657 participants (60%) correctly responded to the four comprehension questions. To
ensure data quality, we only analyzed the responses from these participants.
Our primary interest was whether observing high levels of compensation leads to norm
conformity. The percentage of respondents who chose to conform to the norm by
returning half the transfer to the investor in the High Compensation versus Low
Compensation condition can be found in Figure 6. We found that significantly more
participants who observed the high compensation (76.9%) than those who observed low
compensation (70.1%) chose to conform to the social norm by returning half the transfer,
X2 (1, N=657) = 3.92, p = .048.
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Figure 6. Percentage of participants who chose return half the
amount transferred to them after observing either high or low
compensation. Error bars as 95% confidence intervals

Those who observed low compensation also reported lower levels of normative
expectation (M=6.48) than those who observed high compensation (M=6.84), t(642)= 2.25,
p=.025. We therefore conducted a mediation analysis, shown in Figure 7. We found that
normative expectation mediated the effect of observed level of compensation on
willingness to conform to the norm by returning half the transfer, B=.13, 95% CI=.01 to .25.
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Discussion
The norm stabilization hypothesis proposes that compensation functions to maintain
social norms by broadcasting the compensator’s endorsement of the violated norm. This
hypothesis draws on Bicchieri’s (2006) theory of social norms, which proposes that one of
the conditions for conforming to a social norm is a sufficient number of relevant others
believing that you ought to. This concept is supported by previous work showing that
whether or not one conforms to a norm is conditional on whether or not they believe that
others endorse that norm (Bicchieri & Chavez, 2010; Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009). Therefore, if
compensation can signal one’s endorsement, then that can contribute to other’s
conformity, thereby stabilizing and sustaining the norm.
This study tested two components of the norm stabilization hypothesis. First, we tested
the effect of observing compensation on one’s normative expectation that others thought
that it was wrong to not return the funds. Here we found that observing compensation did
indeed increase observer’s normative expectations. Second, we tested whether observing
compensation drove one to conform to the norm when no third party was present. Here
we found that observing compensation lead participants to conform to the norm
significantly more frequently. Bicchieri’s (2006) social norm theory provides a conceptual
linkage between these two findings, suggesting that observing compensation effects norm
conformity via the increase in normative expectation. In testing this, we found that
normative expectation significantly mediated the effect of observing compensation on the
choice to compensate. This suggests the causal pathway, as predicted by the norm
stabilization hypothesis and social norms theory, that observing compensation leads to
higher normative expectation, which in turn leads to higher levels of compensation.
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It should be acknowledged that the size of the primary effect, an increase of 6.8%, from
70.1% to 76.9%, is relatively small. Given that, it is also important to point out the
components of the study design that provides a particularly strong test of the hypothesis,
but would be expected to reduce the size of the effect. Past work has pointed to the
importance of attentional focusing on normative and empirical expectations in norm
conformity (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 2000). In order to
provide a particularly strong test of the norm stabilization hypothesis, we wanted to avoid
any level of artificially high focus on the level of compensation. We therefore included
both the proportions of investors who invested and trustees who returned. The inclusion
of the proportion of trustees who returned is a particularly strong focal signal of both
normative expectation (revealing how acceptable the trustees think it is to not return the
money) and empirical expectation (directly informing the participant how often people
return money as trustees). Past research has shown that when empirical and normative
expectations are in conflict, people normally act in accordance with their empirical
expectations (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009). Given this, our manipulation of the level of
compensation runs into the restricting force of strong empirical expectation and
normative expectation signals from the behaviors of the trustees. We therefore see
overcoming these countervailing effects as a particularly robust test of the hypothesis, and
find the smaller effect size reasonable.

Study 6
This study serves as a compliment to Study 5, helping disentangle the norm stabilization
hypothesis and reputation signaling hypothesis by testing predictions specific to the
reputation signaling hypothesis. This hypothesis posits that individuals compensate in
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order to inform observers that they know and endorse the norm, and would therefore be
worthwhile partners in future interactions. For this to have been selected for, observers
must in fact prefer to interact with compensators. Study 6 aims to test this prediction.
In this study, subjects were told that they will soon play a trust game. They were told that
they have been selected to play as the investor, and will have some say in who will be the
trustee. They were then shown three candidates who could possibly be the trustee in their
interaction. For each possible trustee, they were shown information about the possible
trustee’s past behavior in a previous interaction. The first possible trustee compensated an
investor in a trust game. The second possible trustee gave an even split in a dictator game.
Finally, the third possible trustee cooperated in a prisoner’s dilemma. Through an
incentive compatible elicitation, participants then ranked the three possible trustees. As
compensation is taken to indicate a disposition to conform to the norm, the reputation
signaling hypothesis predicted that investors would prefer the trust game compensator
over the two alternative trustees.

Method
We recruited 452 participants (215 men, mean age of 36) from the AMT platform to
participate in this study.
We divided participants into two phases. In the first phase, participants were assigned to
play either a trust game with third party compensation, a dictator game, or a prisoner’s
dilemma. Those assigned to the trust game with third party compensation participated in
the interaction as described in Phase 1 of Study 5. Those assigned to the dictator game
were assigned to one of two roles, either dictator or recipient (labeled as 1 or 2 in the
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interaction). The dictator was given a starting allocation of $0.75 and the recipient $0.00.
The dictator was then given the opportunity to transfer $0.25 of their allocation to the
recipient, which would be doubled by the experimenter. Those in the prisoner’s dilemma
game participated in a two party interaction in which each party simultaneously chose to
either cooperate or defect (labeled UP or DOWN in the interaction). If both parties chose
to cooperate, each received $0.50. If both parties chose to defect, each received $0.25. If
one person choose to cooperate, while the other chose to defect, the person who chose to
cooperate would get $0.00, whereas the person who chose to defect would get $0.75.
Importantly, although the context surrounding the decision of the third party in the trust
game, the dictator, and the participant in the prisoner’s dilemma were different, the
fundamental choice they made was the same. In each case, the participant chose whether
or not to increase the amount received by another participant by $0.50 at a cost of $0.25.
After making their choices, the trust game, as in Phase 2 of Study 5, was described to all
participants. They were then told that they may be assigned to the role of trustee in that
interaction in the future. They were then asked, if they were given the opportunity to act
as the trustee in the trust game and the investor transferred to them, whether or not they
would choose to transfer back half their sum to the investor. We ran participants in the
Phase 1 trust game with third party compensation until a third party had the opportunity
to compensate and chose to do so. We ran participants in the dictator game until a
dictator chose to transfer to the recipient. We ran participants in the prisoner’s dilemma
until a pairing both chose to cooperate. The third party from the final trust game, the
dictator from the final dictator game, and one of the cooperators from the final prisoner’s
dilemma were then selected as possible trustees for Phase 2.
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In Phase 2, participants began the study by reading the instructions for the trust game, as
described in Phase 2 of Study 5. They were then told that they had been assigned to the
role of the investor, and now had some say in who would be the trustee in their
interaction. Participants were then shown the list of the three possible trustees. With each
trustee, they were given a description of what that person did in the game they
participated in in Phase 1 (i.e. compensating in the third party trust game, giving in the
dictator game, or cooperating in the prisoner’s dilemma). They were then asked to rank
these three possible trustees in order of who they would most like to serve as the trustee
in their interaction. They were told that the person they selected first would have a 60%
chance of being their trustee, the second person a 30% chance, and the third person a 10%
chance. After making their selection, they were paired and asked whether they would like
to transfer their endowment to the trustee they were paired with.

Results
404 participants (89%) correctly responded to the four comprehension questions. To
ensure data quality, we only analyzed the responses from these participants.
In order to protect against an artificially inflated alpha level, we first tested whether the
distribution of participant’s top choice of partner was different to that expected by chance.
We found that the distribution significantly diverged from the one third selection of each
possible partner, as expected by chance, X2(2, N=404)=6.27, p=.043.
Having confirmed in the omnibus test that the selection of first choice partners
significantly diverged from chance, we then proceeded to assess the selection of each of
the three possible partners. The percentage who selected each of the three possible
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partners as their first choice, relative to the expected one-third selection under chance,
can be found in Figure 8. Here we see that participants selected the kind dictator as their
first choice 28.5% of the time, significantly less than expected by chance X2(1,
N=404)=4.09, p=.043. We also found that participants selected the cooperator in the
prisoner’s dilemma 38.6% of the time, significantly more than expected by chance X2(1,
N=404)=4.83, p=.028. However, we did not find any difference between the 32.9% who
chose the compensator in the trust game and the expected rate under random chance,

Percentage of participants who chose
partner as 1st choice for trustee

X2(1, N=404)=.015, p=.90.
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Figure 8. Percentage of participants who chose each of the three possible
partners as their first choice to act as the trustee. Origin at expected
percentage under random allocation, error bars as 95% confidence intervals.

Discussion
The reputation signaling hypothesis posits that third parties compensate to send a costly
signal of their own knowledge and endorsement of a norm, in order to show themselves to
be worthwhile partners in future interactions governed by the norm. This mechanism
could only have evolved if possible future interaction partners were attuned to whether or
not a possible interaction partner was a compensator when selecting with whom to
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interact. In order to test the reputation signaling hypothesis, we therefore tested whether
observers of compensatory behavior did in fact prefer compensators as future interaction
partners.
We compared the selection of compensators to the selection of two other possible
participants. These other participants, either a fair allocator in a dictator game, or a
cooperator in a prisoner’s dilemma were different in circumstance. The even allocation in
the dictator game suggested that the dictator might be generally prosocial, but such
behavior does not represent conformity with a norm (Bicchieri, 2006). Although the
cooperator in the prisoner’s dilemma did signal their willingness to conform, it was to a
cooperation norm rather than the reciprocity norm present in the trust game.
Importantly, across all three possible trustees, each one made the choice to increase the
amount another participant received by $0.50 at a $0.25 cost to themselves, making the
key difference between the candidates the contextual framing of their acts.
Our results showed that the possible trustee’s past behavior in these previous interaction
did have a significant impact in the selection of a trustee. However, we did not find
support for the reputation signaling hypothesis. We observed the lowest rates of selection
of the dictator who gave an even allocation, and the highest rates of selection of the
prisoner’s dilemma cooperator, with the trust game compensator falling in the middle.
Although inconsistent with our formulation of the reputation signaling hypothesis, the
results we observed still show an interesting pattern of preferences. The even allocating
dictator, which we considered to not broadcast any norm endorsing content but rather
just general pro-sociality, was the least selected option, with the two norm broadcasting
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possible trustees selected more frequently. This suggests that those selecting a partner
may very well be attuned to broadcasting in some fashion. We did not predict that the
prisoner’s dilemma cooperator would be most frequently selected. We do see a possible
explanation for this, which would be explorable in future research. It may be the case that
observing norm conformity, regardless of the particular norm, people focus on the fact
that the individual conformed, attending less to the particular norm they conformed to.
From and evolutionary prospective, this focusing would be justified if it were the case that
different individuals have different general dispositions towards norm conformity, leading
to their conformity to one norm being diagnostic of their conformity to another. This
claim is empirically supported, with individuals who conform to pro-social norms in one
behavioral game being much more likely to conform in other contexts, even when
conducted months apart (Yamagishi, et al., 2013).
In the study in question, it may the case that participants focused on the norm
conforming behavior, despite being conformity to a cooperation rather than reciprocation
norm, because conformity generally is more diagnostic than compensation in the
specifically relevant context. This explanation would therefore be consistent with a
broadened understanding of reputation signaling, where your reputation in the domain of
one norm is linked to your reputation in other norm contexts. This suggested explanation
is contingent on a low degree of within individual heterogeneity in norm conformity
across a variety of norms, as compared to a relatively high degree of between individual
heterogeneity in general disposition to follow norms, an empirical question yet to be
addressed.
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General Discussion
In this chapter, we investigated the three hypotheses developed in Chapter 2: the norm
broadcasting hypothesis, the reputation signaling hypothesis, and the norm stabilization
hypothesis. The norm broadcasting hypothesis is a mid-level functional hypothesis, sitting
in between proximate and ultimate evolutionary hypotheses. The reputation signaling
hypothesis and norm stabilization hypothesis are both at the evolutionary level, offered as
two possible candidates for why the general norm broadcasting hypothesis might be the
case.
We addressed each of the three hypotheses in one of the three studies of this chapter. In
Study 4, we tested the prediction of the general norm broadcasting hypothesis that one’s
willingness to compensate was sensitive to whether one is being observed, as observation
is necessary for the effectiveness of the signal. We found that compensators were in fact
influenced by observers, consistent with the norm broadcasting hypothesis. This result
mirrors that found in the domain of punishment, where the degree to which third parties
were willing to sanction norm violators was shown to be sensitive to whether those third
parties were observed (Kurzban et al., 2007).
We then moved on to address the two ultimate level functions for this behavior, the norm
stabilization and reputation signaling hypotheses, both candidates to serve as the
evolutionary support for the norm broadcasting hypothesis. We allowed for either, or
both, of these hypotheses serve as the evolutionary rationale. In Study 5, we addressed the
norm stabilization hypothesis: that by signaling the compensator’s endorsement of the
norm, compensation serves to stabilize the norm by mitigating the undermining signal of
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the violation itself. This proposed rationale only functions if observers are in fact sensitive
to witnessing compensation, increasing their propensity to conform. In support of the
norm stabilization hypothesis, we found that participants who observed compensation
were more likely to conform to the norm themselves. Additionally, we found that this
effect was mediated by the observer’s normative expectation that others thought they
should conform to the norm, as predicted by the model. This finding is akin to that shown
in the domain of punishment, where participants have been shown to be more likely to act
pro-socially after observing punishment, even if they could not be subject to the same
sanction (Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Stagnaro, Arechar, & Rand, 2017).
Lastly, in Study 6, we investigated predictions made under the reputation signaling
hypothesis: that by signaling the compensator’s knowledge and endorsement of the norm,
compensation serves to better the compensator’s reputation as an adherent to that norm,
and therefore improve their attractiveness as a partner for future interactions. This
proposal only functions if observers do in fact prefer compensators in future interactions.
We failed to find support for the reputation signaling hypothesis, with observers selecting
the compensator at a rate no different than chance. This pattern diverges from that
observed in the punishment domain, in which people have shown a preference to interact
with those who punish (Barclay, 2006; Jordan et al., 2016). Although this divergence could
be due to distinct underlying mechanisms, it is important to first evaluate differences in
study design. The experiments in the punishment domain showed that people prefer to
interact with punishers relative to non-punishers. The parallel in compensation would
plausibly be that people prefer to interact with compensators relative to noncompensators. This test is weaker than that which we evaluated in our study, in which we
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compared a preference for compensators relative to alternates who engaged in similarly
pro-social acts other than compensation. Previous studies allowed for the possibility that
the preference for punishers over non-punishers was not driven by anything specific to the
signal of punishment, but perhaps was driven by preferring someone willing to engage in
any pro-social act. It is therefore possible that the reputational effects of compensation
and punishment are similar, perhaps being taken as signals of general pro-social
tendencies rather than fine-grained endorsements of the specific norm.
In summary, we found that people compensate more when being observed, and that
observing compensation leads to higher degrees of conformity, but found no evidence for
people preferring compensators as partners over similarly pro-social non-compensating
alternatives. Taken together, these results are consistent with our hypothesis that
compensation functions to signal the compensator’s endorsement of the norm, and that
this signal of endorsement functions as a norm-stabilization device. These empirical
results parallel a number of similar findings in the punishment domain, suggesting that
these two behavioral responses may be the result of one underlying cognitive mechanism
responding to the violation of social norms. In this study, we found that our video
manipulation of moral outrage increased compensation across situations, consistent with
previous results suggesting anger to be a particularly difficult emotion to manipulate in
isolation (Gross & Levenson, 1995). We found that the effect of the manipulation on
compensation was mediated by a change in moral outrage only when the loss was due to a
norm violation.
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CONCLUSION
The compensation of victims can be found in groups ranging from hunter-gather to largescale societies (Hill, et al., 2011; Rothaus, 2016). It is present at various social scales, from
individuals compensating one another to enshrinement in various legal frameworks
(Mullenix & Stewart, 2002; Palmer, 1979). It is observed both in and outside the lab
(Charness et al., 2008). This research adds to our understanding of the psychological
underpinnings of this phenomena. First, it provides a finer-grained understanding of the
interaction between context and compensation, showing that moral outrage can motivate
the compensation of norm violation victims, rather than empathic concern as previously
argued. Second, it develops possible evolutionary accounts for this moral outrage driven
compensation, and empirically tests the predictions of these accounts.
Previous work argued that victim compensation was motivated by empathic concern,
whereas punishment was motivated by moral outrage (Coke et al., 1978; Fehr &
Fischbacher, 2004). In Chapter 1, we showed that this understanding is incomplete, and
provide a more nuanced picture. In Study 1 we demonstrated that, while trait disposition
to feel empathic concern did correlate with a willingness to compensate the victims of bad
investment decisions as demonstrated in previous work, the compensation of the victims
of norm violations was uniquely predicted by a disposition to feel moral outrage.
Additionally, we found that empathic concern and moral outrage were highly correlated,
providing a plausible rationale for previous studies which demonstrated a relationship
between empathic concern and the compensation of norm violation victims which failed
to control for moral outrage.
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Study 2 expanded the finding that moral outrage motivates compensation when the loss
was due to the violation of a social norm beyond trait dispositions, into the domain of
emotional states. In Study 2.a we directly manipulated moral outrage, and found that
increasing moral outrage increased compensation across situations, consistent with
previous work showing that anger is a particularly hard emotion to manipulate in
isolation. We therefore tested the degree to which reported moral outrage mediated the
effect of the manipulation on compensation, and found that moral outrage only mediated
the effect on compensation when the loss was due to the violation of a social norm. We
conducted a similar experiment in Study 2.b, but instead manipulated empathic concern.
Here we found that increasing empathic concern did increase levels of compensation
when the loss was due to the investment choice of the person experiencing the loss, but
did not increase the compensation of the victim of a social norm violation. Taken together,
these studies demonstrate on both the state and trait level that moral outrage is a unique
driver of victim compensation, but only when compensating the loss of the victim of a
norm violation.
We followed up this investigation with a replication of Study 2.a, in which we added
monetary incentives as well as a modified dependent measure of compensation (Study 3).
In this study, we did not find the previously observed effect of increasing moral outrage
increasing the compensation of norm violation victims. Our best account of this finding
relates to the particular dependent measure we adopted, which instead of measuring with
what intensity the participant wants the victim to be restored, it measured the dollar
amount the respondent thought would be correct. We therefore suspect that the null
result observed may be the result of emotions such as moral outrage influencing the
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intensity with which the victim wants the respondent restored, rather than what amount
they deem to be fair restoration.
These results broaden our understanding of the emotional determinants of compensation,
as well as the pro-social consequences of moral outrage. While previous work had
identified empathic concern as the sole motivator for compensation (Batson et al., 1981;
Coke et al., 1978; Toi & Batson, 1982), our studies reveal a richer landscape in which the
particular emotional motivator is context specific, with moral outrage serving a critical
role when a loss due to the violation of a social norm. These results also buttress the claim
recently advanced in moral philosophy and psychology that despite anger often being
described as an anti-social emotion (Averill, 1983), it often serves a pro-social purpose,
such as deterring the intentional violation of norms (Gaus, 2011; Prinz, 2011; Russell &
Giner-Sorolla, 2011). Here we see a new domain in which anger serves a prosocial good:
driving the compensation of norm violation victims.
The findings described above led us to take up the question of the evolution of the
compensation of norm violation victims. When two behaviors have distinct emotional
determinants, they are taken to be the result of two distinctly evolved evolutionary
systems. While others have theorized that compensation may act as a form of social
insurance, sustained through indirect reciprocity, this unitary explanation does not
account for our finding that compensation is driven by two different underlying systems,
manifested in different contexts. While a general social insurance theory may account for
empathic concern driven compensation, it fails to account for the moral outrage driven
compensation we identified.
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To address this shortcoming, we looked to the literature on the evolution of punishment.
As punishment is driven by the same emotion (moral outrage) and occurs in the same
context (a social norm violation), we found it plausible that the punishment of norm
violators and the compensation of their victims may be driven by the same underlying
process, both behavioral results of a single norm violation response system. We therefore
expanded two models of punishment, showing how they might lead to the emergence of a
norm violation response system which results in both compensation and punishment.
We first expanded on models which suggested that punishment could serve a costly
signaling purpose, demonstrating the punisher’s knowledge of local norms, a prerequisite
for compliance. We argued that this same logic can be extended to compensation, where
only one knowledgeable of local norms is capable of efficiently compensating what is
actually a violation of a local norm. We also developed an alternative account, based on
cultural group selection. Cultural group selection models rely on stable within group
norms to reduce within group selection pressure, even when migration occurs between
groups. Punishment maintains this within group stability by directly deterring violations,
but also serves a pedagogical purpose, teaching those who observe the punishment what
the normative beliefs of the group members are. While compensation cannot have the
direct deterrent effect of punishment, it can serve a similar instructive purpose. These
extensions provide a unique evolutionary accounting of the widespread behavior of
compensating the victims of norm violations. Importantly, they also integrate two
previously distinct areas of evolutionary theory, punishing victims and punishing their
perpetrators.
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To assess these accounts of the evolution of compensation, we derived novel predictions
from each and tested them experimentally. Both proposed accounts rely on compensation
to relay information (either the compensator’s reputation or the norms of the
community). In either case, these models therefore predict that a willingness to
compensate would be conditional of the degree to which that compensation was observed.
We tested this prediction in Study 4, observing that having participants make their
compensation decisions publicly substantially increased participant’s willingness to
compensate. This effect is similar to that observed with punishment (Kurzban et al.,
2007), consistent with a unified norm violation response system.
After testing a joint prediction of both models, we then separated them and developed a
unique prediction to test from each. If compensation evolved to stabilize local norms
within a group, then observing compensation would be predicted to increase compliance.
To test this prediction in Study 5, we had participants choose whether to comply with a
social norm, having just seen summary statistics of past participant’s behavior. All
statistics were held constant except for how many past participants chose to compensate a
victim of the norm the participant would then choose whether or not to violate. We found
that those shown high rates of compensation were more likely to comply with the norm
than those shown low rates. This too is similar to effects observed for punishment,
providing additional evidence for a unified norm violation response system (Fehr &
Gachter, 2000; Stagnaro, Arechar, & Rand, 2017).
We then assessed the hypothesis that compensation functions as a signal of the
compensator’s status in the community and knowledge of the relevant local norms. This
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hypothesis relied on observers preferentially interacting with compensators. We tested
this prediction by allowing participants to choose from a set of possible partners, on
whom they would have to rely on to conform to a reciprocity norm. One partner
compensated a victim of the relevant reciprocity norm, one conformed to an unrelated
norm, and one engaged in general pro-sociality. While we found that participants selected
the generally pro-social partner less than by chance, it was the partner who conformed to
an unrelated norm who was selected most, counter to our prediction. This result runs
contrary to the underlying logic of our hypothesis that compensation signals specific
knowledge of the relevant applicable norm, although it may indicate a new line of
investigation, testing the degree to which observers believe conforming to a norm in one
domain is predictive of conformist behavior in another.
Taken together, these results enrich our understanding of the emotional determinates and
evolutionary roots of victim compensation. We expand the known motivators for
compensation to include not only empathic concern but also moral outrage. Additionally,
we demonstrate the interaction between these emotional drivers and social context, where
moral outrage drives compensation only for victims of social norm violations. We built on
existing models of compensation and punishment to account for these findings at an
evolutionary level, suggesting an evolved norm violation response system, which includes
both perpetrator punishment and victim compensation. Through experimental
investigation, we then concluded that the strongest current evidence is for compensation
to have emerged as a norm stabilization device, selected for through cultural group
selection.
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Our interpretation of the studies described above is not without limitations. The subject
pools consisted entirely of WEIRD participants (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). It is
therefore only to that population that we can confidently generalize our results. To further
substantiate the claim that humans evolved a particular cognitive mechanism, with
particular emotional correlates, these findings must be conceptually replicated in a more
diverse population. Of similar concern, we conducted our studies entirely in artificial
settings, either in lab or via the internet, entirely within the trust game, both of which
pose threats to external validity. To address this concern, we will need to expand our
sphere of measurement less controlled environments to ensure that our results are not
merely an artifact of our particular experimental setup.
The proposed norm violation response system provides an opportunity for a rich line of
research to better understand the relationship uncovered between compensation and
punishment. Although we propose that this system results in both punishment and
compensation to serve a similar purpose, we have yet to investigate how these to
behaviors interact, and in what context we might expect one versus the other. Past
research has shown that punishment and compensation function as imperfect substitutes,
where making one available reduces demand for the other (Chavez & Bicchieri, 2013;
Jordan et al., 2016). Building on our understanding of the evolutionary costs of
punishment and compensation, we may predict a number of relevant factors. As
punishment can attract retribution (Chagnon, 1988; Cinyabuguma et al., 2006), we may
predict that compensation will occur more frequently when the perpetrator is powerful
and therefore can more easily counter-punish. Similarly, we may expect that while
perpetrators may try to hide, victims may be much more readily available. We may
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therefore predict that accessibility may account for a preference to compensate over
punish in more realistic scenarios. Ecological observation may reveal additional factors
driving both the choice to intervene after a norm violation, and if so, whether to help the
victim or punish the perpetrator. Additionally, future work may integrate the social norm
response system into formal models of norm propagation, providing empirical support
and psychological realism.
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